Honest struggles on God’s omniscience.

[Derf]

No, I'm not AI.

The ideas come from my own work and study, particularly around grief, identity, suffering, and Christian anthropology. The Fossett Framework is a model I've been developing to explore how relational rupture affects human identity and meaning-making.

That said, I understand why you asked. The internet is full of AI-generated content right now, and highly structured writing can sometimes read that way.

I'm less interested in whether the writing sounds like AI and more interested in whether the argument itself is worth discussing. If you disagree with any part of it, I'd be interested in hearing where.

Ok. The other reason is that I had difficulty seeing how your post was relevant to the thread topic. Maybe you can give a short description of your thoughts on the topic. (It's been awhile since I wrote my question to you, and I don't remember what you were getting at, just my initial impression.)

Iow, what does all that you wrote mean in terms of God's omniscience?

 

[JudgeRightly]

That's not how I understand the Gospel, nor our father Abraham (Romans 4:1, 4:12, 4:16). 1st Peter 1:20 God knew He was going to offer His only begotten Son before creation, this was the POINT of Abraham's test, so that God could preach the Gospel to our father Abraham (Acts 3:25, Galatians 3:8). The content of the Gospel, "a lamb without blemish and without spot" "was foreordained before the foundation of the world". But the preaching of the Gospel was to Abraham, "our father" because of his faith. So Abraham was integral to the Gospel from before the foundation of the World.

You are conflating two different things.

I have no problem with God foreordaining Christ as the Lamb before the foundation of the world. I have no problem with God promising blessing through Abraham’s seed. I have no problem with Genesis 22 preaching the gospel typologically through Isaac, the ram, and the provision of a substitute.

But none of that says God exhaustively foreknew Abraham’s obedience before the test.

1 Peter 1:20 says Christ was foreordained before the foundation of the world. It does not say Abraham’s individual free choice in Genesis 22 was already settled before Abraham made it. Galatians 3:8 says the gospel was preached beforehand to Abraham, saying, “In you all the nations shall be blessed.” It does not say Abraham’s obedience on Moriah was exhaustively foreknown before God tested him.

Abraham was the man God chose and used, and once God made promises to Abraham, God was faithful to those promises. But that does not mean Abraham was metaphysically necessary to the gospel from before creation, nor does it mean God would have been trapped if Abraham had refused or failed. God can judge, redirect, preserve the promised line, raise the dead, or otherwise keep His word without Abraham’s obedience being exhaustively foreknown and fixed before the test.

So yes, Abraham is central to the promises concerning the seed. Yes, Genesis 22 is typological. Yes, God intended to provide the Lamb.

But Genesis 22 still says God tested Abraham, Abraham obeyed, and then God said:

“Now I know that you fear God, since you have not withheld your son, your only son, from Me.”​

And the passage does not stop there. God then says, “By Myself I have sworn... because you have done this thing, and have not withheld your son, your only son,” and again, “In your seed all the nations of the earth shall be blessed, because you have obeyed My voice” (Genesis 22:16–18). That is the language of response, not the language of a merely staged event whose outcome was already exhaustively settled before Abraham obeyed.

The typology does not erase the test. The promise does not erase the contingency. Christ being foreordained does not make Abraham’s obedience a settled future free choice before Abraham obeyed. The certainty of Christ as the Lamb rests on God’s faithfulness and power, not on Abraham’s future obedience being exhaustively foreknown and fixed before the test. God does not need to eternally decree, exhaustively foreknow, or pre-fix every future free choice in order to bring about His plans; He is able to judge, redirect, preserve, provide, raise the dead, and fulfill His word without making human choices illusory.

 

[Douglas Fossett]

Ok. The other reason is that I had difficulty seeing how your post was relevant to the thread topic. Maybe you can give a short description of your thoughts on the topic. (It's been awhile since I wrote my question to you, and I don't remember what you were getting at, just my initial impression.)

Iow, what does all that you wrote mean in terms of God's omniscience?

Fair question.

My point wasn't to challenge God's omniscience. I fully affirm that God knows all things.

What I was trying to address was the idea that if God already knew humanity would sin and suffer, why create humans at all instead of beings who simply obeyed?

My response was that Scripture presents God as creating humans for genuine relationship rather than mere compliance. A robot can obey a command, but it cannot meaningfully love, trust, worship, or enter into relationship. Those things require freedom and the possibility of rejection.

So God's omniscience means He knew the consequences of creating relational beings, including the suffering that would result from humanity's rebellion. Yet Scripture also presents Him as willing to enter that suffering Himself through Christ rather than remain distant from it.

So my point wasn't that God's omniscience is limited. My point was that God appears to value genuine relationship enough to create beings capable of both communion and rebellion, knowing the cost involved.

That's the connection I was trying to make.

 

[Derf]

Fair question.

My point wasn't to challenge God's omniscience. I fully affirm that God knows all things.

What I was trying to address was the idea that if God already knew humanity would sin and suffer, why create humans at all instead of beings who simply obeyed?

My response was that Scripture presents God as creating humans for genuine relationship rather than mere compliance. A robot can obey a command, but it cannot meaningfully love, trust, worship, or enter into relationship. Those things require freedom and the possibility of rejection.

So God's omniscience means He knew the consequences of creating relational beings, including the suffering that would result from humanity's rebellion. Yet Scripture also presents Him as willing to enter that suffering Himself through Christ rather than remain distant from it.

So my point wasn't that God's omniscience is limited. My point was that God appears to value genuine relationship enough to create beings capable of both communion and rebellion, knowing the cost involved.

That's the connection I was trying to make.

The point of the thread topic, afaik, is that exhaustive foreknowledge (the usual definition of omniscience), doesn't allow for anyone to choose to have relationship with God, since all their choices, communion or rebellion, are known before they exist.

 

[Douglas Fossett]

The point of the thread topic, afaik, is that exhaustive foreknowledge (the usual definition of omniscience), doesn't allow for anyone to choose to have relationship with God, since all their choices, communion or rebellion, are known before they exist.

I think that's the heart of the disagreement.

I would distinguish between God's knowledge of a choice and God's causation of that choice.

Knowing an event will occur is not necessarily the same thing as determining that it occurs.

For example, if I somehow knew with certainty what choice a person would make tomorrow, my knowledge would not be the cause of that choice. The person would still be making it.

The Christian tradition has wrestled with exactly how God's exhaustive foreknowledge relates to human freedom, and I don't think all Christians answer it the same way. Some lean toward determinism, others toward libertarian freedom, and still others toward various compatibilist positions.

My point was narrower. If genuine relationship requires the possibility of both communion and rejection, then the biblical narrative seems to assume that human choices have meaningful significance even if God possesses exhaustive knowledge of them.

So the question for me becomes: Does foreknowledge itself eliminate meaningful agency, or does it simply mean that God knows the choices free creatures will make?

That's where I think the real debate lies.

 

[Derf]

I think that's the heart of the disagreement.

I would distinguish between God's knowledge of a choice and God's causation of that choice.

Knowing an event will occur is not necessarily the same thing as determining that it occurs.

I agree, but knowing an event will occur does mean the event is determined. For instance, I know Jesus will return, but I didn't determine His return. If everything future event is known infallibly by God, then all those events are indeed determined. Now, if you agree correct that God did not determine those events, but they are determined, then somebody else must have determined them. You might say that we determine our future events, but we did not exist when you say God already knew what we would do.

So we are left with the idea that someone who is not God determines every future event, and God only knows about it. Who is this person who appears to be greater than God?

For example, if I somehow knew with certainty what choice a person would make tomorrow, my knowledge would not be the cause of that choice. The person would still be making it.

I would suggest that if you knew the choice infallibly, then it's because you know that person and his mindset (will). But let's stretch it out a bit and discuss a person whom you don't know, say the child of your sister who isn't married yet (I'm assuming she won't have children until she's married), nor does she have any marital prospects yet. What college major will that child choose when he is grown to adulthood?

The Christian tradition has wrestled with exactly how God's exhaustive foreknowledge relates to human freedom, and I don't think all Christians answer it the same way. Some lean toward determinism, others toward libertarian freedom, and still others toward various compatibilist positions.

My point was narrower. If genuine relationship requires the possibility of both communion and rejection, then the biblical narrative seems to assume that human choices have meaningful significance even if God possesses exhaustive knowledge of them.

What you've assumed is that the biblical narrative says God has exhaustive knowledge of them. I disagree.

So the question for me becomes: Does foreknowledge itself eliminate meaningful agency, or does it simply mean that God knows the choices free creatures will make?

Go back to my previous assertion. If the choices are known, then it does eliminate free agency, whoever (besides the person) made the determination--and you can't make a determination when you don't exist.

That's where I think the real debate lies.

Check your assumptions, because they may trip you up.

 

[JudgeRightly]

What I was trying to address was the idea that if God already knew humanity would sin and suffer, why create humans at all instead of beings who simply obeyed?

He did not know that as a settled future fact, because man had not been created yet and Adam had not yet chosen.

The future doesn't exist as a settled reality sitting somewhere for God to observe. God cannot know something that does not exist. Before creation, Adam did not exist. His choice did not exist. His choice had not yet been made.

God knew it was a possibility for Adam to disobey, because He created him with the capability of doing so. But until Adam took a bite of the fruit of the Tree of the knowledge of good and evil, his action was not "necessary."

I would distinguish between God's knowledge of a choice and God's causation of that choice.

Knowing an event will occur is not necessarily the same thing as determining that it occurs.

For example, if I somehow knew with certainty what choice a person would make tomorrow, my knowledge would not be the cause of that choice. The person would still be making it.

The Christian tradition has wrestled with exactly how God's exhaustive foreknowledge relates to human freedom, and I don't think all Christians answer it the same way. Some lean toward determinism, others toward libertarian freedom, and still others toward various compatibilist positions.

My point was narrower. If genuine relationship requires the possibility of both communion and rejection, then the biblical narrative seems to assume that human choices have meaningful significance even if God possesses exhaustive knowledge of them.

So the question for me becomes: Does foreknowledge itself eliminate meaningful agency, or does it simply mean that God knows the choices free creatures will make?

The answer is, quite simply, yes, if that foreknowledge is infallible.

There's nothing complicated about this.

Let T stand for some future act, such as “you answer the telephone tomorrow at 9 a.m.” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy lays out the basic argument this way:

(1) Yesterday God infallibly believed T. [Supposition of infallible foreknowledge] (2) If E occurred in the past, it is now-necessary that E occurred then. [Principle of the Necessity of the Past] (3) It is now-necessary that yesterday God believed T. [1, 2] (4) Necessarily, if yesterday God believed T, then T. [Definition of “infallibility”] (5) If p is now-necessary, and necessarily (p → q), then q is now-necessary. [Transfer of Necessity Principle] (6) So it is now-necessary that T. [3,4,5] (7) If it is now-necessary that T, then you cannot do otherwise than answer the telephone tomorrow at 9 am. [Definition of “necessary”] (8) Therefore, you cannot do otherwise than answer the telephone tomorrow at 9 am. [6, 7] (9) If you cannot do otherwise when you do an act, you do not act freely. [Principle of Alternate Possibilities] (10) Therefore, when you answer the telephone tomorrow at 9 am, you will not do it freely. [8, 9]

Foreknowledge and Free Will (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

The problem here is not "causation," but rather "necessity."

I agree that knowledge of an action, by itself, does not itself cause the action.

But if the knowledge of the action is infallible, then that knowledge cannot be wrong (by definition), and so there is no possible alternative, because any alternative would falsify that knowledge.

Thus, if God infallibly knew that Adam would sin before he existed, then Adam's sin could not fail to happen. If Adam could have chosen not to sin, then God's prior knowledge could have been false. But if God's knowledge could not be false, then Adam could not have chosen otherwise.

Either God knew Adam's "choice" in advance, and I put choice in quotes because at that point it isn't one except in name only since Adam could not do otherwise, or Adam did have a real alternative, and God's knowledge of future free choices is not exhaustive and infallible.

If Adam could obey, then Adam’s disobedience was not infallibly settled beforehand. If Adam’s disobedience was infallibly settled beforehand, then Adam could not obey.

Saying “God only knew what Adam would freely choose” does not solve it, because if God infallibly knew Adam would choose sin, then choosing otherwise was impossible. Calling the impossible alternative “free” does not make it meaningful.

A free choice requires that the alternative be genuinely possible. Exhaustive infallible foreknowledge removes that possibility by making the outcome settled before the creature even exists.

 

[Douglas Fossett]

He did not know that as a settled future fact, because man had not been created yet and Adam had not yet chosen.

The future doesn't exist as a settled reality sitting somewhere for God to observe. God cannot know something that does not exist. Before creation, Adam did not exist. His choice did not exist. His choice had not yet been made.

God knew it was a possibility for Adam to disobey, because He created him with the capability of doing so. But until Adam took a bite of the fruit of the Tree of the knowledge of good and evil, his action was not "necessary."



The answer is, quite simply, yes, if that foreknowledge is infallible.

There's nothing complicated about this.

Let T stand for some future act, such as “you answer the telephone tomorrow at 9 a.m.” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy lays out the basic argument this way:

(1) Yesterday God infallibly believed T. [Supposition of infallible foreknowledge] (2) If E occurred in the past, it is now-necessary that E occurred then. [Principle of the Necessity of the Past] (3) It is now-necessary that yesterday God believed T. [1, 2] (4) Necessarily, if yesterday God believed T, then T. [Definition of “infallibility”] (5) If p is now-necessary, and necessarily (p → q), then q is now-necessary. [Transfer of Necessity Principle] (6) So it is now-necessary that T. [3,4,5] (7) If it is now-necessary that T, then you cannot do otherwise than answer the telephone tomorrow at 9 am. [Definition of “necessary”] (8) Therefore, you cannot do otherwise than answer the telephone tomorrow at 9 am. [6, 7] (9) If you cannot do otherwise when you do an act, you do not act freely. [Principle of Alternate Possibilities] (10) Therefore, when you answer the telephone tomorrow at 9 am, you will not do it freely. [8, 9]

Foreknowledge and Free Will (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

The problem here is not "causation," but rather "necessity."

I agree that knowledge of an action, by itself, does not itself cause the action.

But if the knowledge of the action is infallible, then that knowledge cannot be wrong (by definition), and so there is no possible alternative, because any alternative would falsify that knowledge.

Thus, if God infallibly knew that Adam would sin before he existed, then Adam's sin could not fail to happen. If Adam could have chosen not to sin, then God's prior knowledge could have been false. But if God's knowledge could not be false, then Adam could not have chosen otherwise.

Either God knew Adam's "choice" in advance, and I put choice in quotes because at that point it isn't one except in name only since Adam could not do otherwise, or Adam did have a real alternative, and God's knowledge of future free choices is not exhaustive and infallible.

If Adam could obey, then Adam’s disobedience was not infallibly settled beforehand. If Adam’s disobedience was infallibly settled beforehand, then Adam could not obey.

Saying “God only knew what Adam would freely choose” does not solve it, because if God infallibly knew Adam would choose sin, then choosing otherwise was impossible. Calling the impossible alternative “free” does not make it meaningful.

A free choice requires that the alternative be genuinely possible. Exhaustive infallible foreknowledge removes that possibility by making the outcome settled before the creature even exists.

I think we're getting closer to identifying the actual point of disagreement.

My assumption is that God's exhaustive foreknowledge and meaningful human agency are compatible, even if I acknowledge that explaining exactly how they fit together is difficult.

Your assumption appears to be that if a future act is infallibly known, then it is necessarily fixed in a way that eliminates genuine alternatives.

JudgeRightly seems to be making a related but slightly different argument: that future free choices do not yet exist as settled realities and therefore cannot be known as settled facts.

Those are different challenges to the classical view of omniscience.

What I find interesting is that Christians have historically arrived at very different conclusions on this question. Classical theists, Augustinians, Thomists, Molinists, Calvinists, Arminians, and Open Theists all affirm God's omniscience, yet they explain the relationship between divine knowledge and human freedom differently.

Where I would hesitate is moving directly from "God knows a future act" to "therefore someone other than the creature must have determined it." That seems to assume that certainty and causation are the same thing, which is precisely one of the points under debate.

Likewise, I am not convinced that God's knowledge must be limited to what presently exists within time. The classical Christian understanding has generally held that God is not merely another observer moving through history alongside us, but transcends time altogether.

So I agree that the real issue is not causation but necessity. The question is whether God's infallible knowledge makes an act necessary in a way that eliminates meaningful agency, or whether God's knowledge is certain because He perfectly knows what free creatures will choose.

That is where I think the discussion actually turns.

 

[Clete]

I think that he was throwing in some "onimipresent" passages to "pile on" with the "omnis" to make his "argument" appear more persuasive.

A complete failure for sure.

It's interesting that I didn't even bother to read the passages he cited. They don't teach omni-anything, in the classical meaning of the terms.

 

[JudgeRightly]

For the record, I have no problem with someone using AI to help organize a post. What I object to is posting polished filler without owning or editing the argument.

But there is a very clear and obvious difference between a well-structured post and AI-generated fog that sounds careful while avoiding the actual issue.

I think we're getting closer to identifying the actual point of disagreement.

This reads like AI-generated filler, but yes, the point of disagreement is clear enough.

My assumption is that God's exhaustive foreknowledge and meaningful human agency are compatible, even if I acknowledge that explaining exactly how they fit together is difficult.

That's the very point of contention.

You can't just assume what is in dispute. That's not how discussion works. If exhaustive infallible foreknowledge and meaningful human agency are compatible, then you need to show how, not merely say that they are while admitting it is difficult to explain.

And might I add, the difficulty is not accidental. The difficulty is that the claim is contradictory. Truth is not self-contradictory.

Your assumption appears to be that if a future act is infallibly known, then it is necessarily fixed in a way that eliminates genuine alternatives.

No, that's the argument I'm making, not just an assumption. There's a difference.

If God infallibly knows Adam will sin, then Adam’s sin cannot fail to happen. If Adam can refrain from sinning, then God’s prior knowledge can be false. If God’s prior knowledge cannot be false, then Adam cannot refrain from sinning.

Again, the issue is not causation, but necessity.

JudgeRightly seems to be making a related but slightly different argument: that future free choices do not yet exist as settled realities and therefore cannot be known as settled facts.

At least edit what the machine gives you.

The arguments are two sides of the same coin.

If a future free act is not settled, then it cannot be known as settled. If it is already known as settled, then the creature cannot do otherwise.

Those are different challenges to the classical view of omniscience.

They are two sides of the same problem: either the future free act is not settled, in which case it cannot be known as settled, or it is settled, in which case the person genuinely cannot do otherwise.

What I find interesting is that Christians have historically arrived at very different conclusions on this question. Classical theists, Augustinians, Thomists, Molinists, Calvinists, Arminians, and Open Theists all affirm God's omniscience, yet they explain the relationship between divine knowledge and human freedom differently.

Listing the historical options does not tell us which premise of the fatalism argument you reject. It only tells us that different systems have tried to deal with the problem.

Where I would hesitate is moving directly from "God knows a future act" to "therefore someone other than the creature must have determined it." That seems to assume that certainty and causation are the same thing, which is precisely one of the points under debate.

That's Derf's argument, not mine, though I'm not in disagreement with his point.

My argument is narrower: if a future act is infallibly known, then it cannot be otherwise. You can say God did not cause the choice, but that does not restore the possibility of doing otherwise.

Likewise, I am not convinced that God's knowledge must be limited to what presently exists within time.

Whether you are convinced or not is in fact irrelevant.

"What is God supposed to be knowing?"

God can know possibilities. He can know His own intentions. He can know what He will do. He can know all actual facts.

But a future free choice that has not yet been made is not an actual fact. It is a possibility. To know it as a settled fact before it is made is to make it settled before it is made.

The classical Christian understanding has generally held that God is not merely another observer moving through history alongside us, but transcends time altogether.

Addressed here: https://kgov.com/time

Timelessness does not automatically solve the problem. If Adam’s sin is timelessly fixed, then Adam still cannot do otherwise. Removing the word “before” does not restore the alternative.

The question remains: could Adam have refrained from sinning?

If yes, then the supposedly fixed fact could have been otherwise.

If no, then Adam did not have a genuine alternative.

So I agree that the real issue is not causation but necessity.

Another AI-sounding phrase.

Are you, @Douglas Fossett, actually agreeing here, or is the machine just smoothing over the disagreement?

The question is whether God's infallible knowledge makes an act necessary in a way that eliminates meaningful agency, or whether God's knowledge is certain because He perfectly knows what free creatures will choose.

I just demonstrated that it does do just that.

“God perfectly knows what free creatures will choose” is just a restatement of exhaustive foreknowledge. It does not answer the problem.

If God infallibly knows Adam will sin, can Adam refrain from sinning?

If yes, then God’s knowledge is not infallible.

If no, then Adam cannot do otherwise.

That is where I think the discussion actually turns.

More AI filler text.

Answer it directly.

Can Adam do otherwise than what God infallibly knows Adam will do?

If he can, then God’s foreknowledge is not infallible.

If he cannot, then Adam does not have a genuine alternative.

 

[Right Divider]

If a future free act is not settled, then it cannot be known as settled. If it is already known as settled, then the creature cannot do otherwise.

That is PERFECT!

That is the final answer...

If they can refute that... (which they cannot) then they win... They lose.

 

[Derf]

I think we're getting closer to identifying the actual point of disagreement.

My assumption is that God's exhaustive foreknowledge and meaningful human agency are compatible, even if I acknowledge that explaining exactly how they fit together is difficult.

One thing is to try to figure out how God knows things. Is the knowledge inate or acquired? If there are any scriotures about God acquiring knowledge, then it speaks against exhaustive foreknowledge, don't you think?

Here's one:
Jeremiah 17:10 KJV — I the LORD search the heart, I try the reins, even to give every man according to his ways, and according to the fruit of his doings.

Does it make sense to say that the verse means that God already knows what He is searching the heart and trying the reins for? If He already knows the information He is searching for, what is the verse actually saying?

Your assumption appears to be that if a future act is infallibly known, then it is necessarily fixed in a way that eliminates genuine alternatives.

Yes.

JudgeRightly seems to be making a related but slightly different argument: that future free choices do not yet exist as settled realities and therefore cannot be known as settled facts.

His point is that God's omniscience is not harmed by His not knowing something that doesn't have a truth value.

Those are different challenges to the classical view of omniscience.

What I find interesting is that Christians have historically arrived at very different conclusions on this question. Classical theists, Augustinians, Thomists, Molinists, Calvinists, Arminians, and Open Theists all affirm God's omniscience, yet they explain the relationship between divine knowledge and human freedom differently.

And we should diligently seek to find out which one or ones are more scripturally and logically supported.

Where I would hesitate is moving directly from "God knows a future act" to "therefore someone other than the creature must have determined it." That seems to assume that certainty and causation are the same thing, which is precisely one of the points under debate.

You missed a point. If you don't exist, you cant determine anything. But if something is infallibly known, then it has been determined. Therefore, we should look for the real determiner of your choices, which were determibed without your input.

Likewise, I am not convinced that God's knowledge must be limited to what presently exists within time.

No, you've missed something here, too. God can decide things before they happen. (You can too, but your decisions might be overridden.) If God decides something before it happens, and He is powerful enough to bring it to pass, then He certainly can know things before they happen. Therefore God's knowledge is not limited to what presently exists ("within time" is superfluous in your sentence).

The classical Christian understanding has generally held that God is not merely another observer moving through history alongside us, but transcends time altogether.

I don't know how far back such a "classical" understanding goes. I think it is a fairly recent development.

So I agree that the real issue is not causation but necessity.

But causation is the real issue, imo. Something that is necessary could be caused by multiple persons, perhaps.

The question is whether God's infallible knowledge makes an act necessary in a way that eliminates meaningful agency,

No, for most things it does not--but it might change who the agent is.

or whether God's knowledge is certain because He perfectly knows what free creatures will choose.

Which means the choices are determined--it can't be otherwise. If the choices are determined before the agent exists, he's not really the agent, is he?

That is where I think the discussion actually turns.

I think you are missing the true point in the discussion.

 

[way 2 go]

A near perfect definition of an appeal to tradition fallacy.

precedent which has not been overthrown by heterodox open theism

It is not an inference or an implication. We state it outright that God does not know the future in any sense similar to what Classical Christian dogma teaches.

open theism infers not only does God not know the knowable he is not omnipresent

I know until open theism came along everyone got it wrong.

but to your point you mean what the bible teaches ,

(Romans 8:29) For whom he foreknew, he also foreordained to be conformed to the image of his Son, that he might be the firstborn among many brethren
(Jeremiah 1:5) Before I formed thee in the belly I knew thee, and before thou camest forth out of the womb I sanctified thee; I have appointed thee a prophet unto the nations

do open theist have a book of Daniel or do you just tear that one out ?

We do not state that because we pull it out of the clear blue sky but because it is the only biblical and rationally consistent position to take. Neither of which is the final arbiter of truth for the Classical theist.

it's irrational to say God knows all that is knowable then deny it
God knew sodom was evil but didn't know sodom was evil , ah the special pleading

Jeremiah 23:23-24Psalm 139:7-12

Those passages nor any other passage in the whole of scripture teaches that God is omniscient.

'if you ignore all the verses that infer\teach omniscience then there are no verses that infer\teach omniscience '
Neo in the matrix
uh no that was about a spoon ¯\_(ツ)_/¯

but those verses were about omnipresence , as in God didn't need to go to sodom to know if it was evil

The other thing that Open Theists do not do is to read our doctrines into the text. Classical theism, on the other hand, cannot survive at all without doing so. The two passages you cite are as good examples as exist. Neither of them teach omniscience at all.

I won't bore you with a full reply. JudgeRightly's post is excellent and doesn't need any help from me.

¯\(°_o)/¯
Revelation 4:1

 

[Idolater]

Shawn loves ketchup on his hotdogs. At today's graduation cookout there will be grilled meats—hotdogs, burgers, steak tips, marinated chicken. Shawn prefers hotdogs over everything else.

It is settled: Shawn is getting a hotdog, and he is putting ketchup on it. He COULD choose something else—there's mayo, mustard, relish, chili, onions, and plenty of other meats—but he’s not going to. He has already made up his mind. It's fixed. Hotdog, ketchup.

Does the fact that this is settled destroy Shawn's freedom? is he now a robot with no real choice? ofc not. The settled outcome doesn’t remove his ability to choose differently. It just means he WON'T.

Now say God 'happens by' and sees the whole situation. To us it looks like God foresees Shawn eating a ketchup hotdog. To God it is simply sight—He sees what Shawn has settled on. He has searched Shawn's heart and sees the event is fixed in Shawn's heart, so it is fixed in reality. This is classical theism, and I find it a remarkably modest claim.

The Open Theist says that if the outcome is settled in advance, then Shawn's freedom has been destroyed and he is turned into a puppet. That strikes me as the much more ambitious (and strained) claim.

 

[Clete]

precedent which has not been overthrown by heterodox open theism

The point is that this is not an argument! Precedent can be wrong - and often is!

open theism infers not only does God not know the knowable he is not omnipresent

Not in the classical sense of the term. It isn't "Open Theism" that "infers" this. The bible teaches it explicitly. Open Theism simply acknowledges the biblical teaching. In no case is it an "inference".

I know until open theism came along everyone got it wrong.

Not everyone.

The false teaching of the Classics did get quite a large following because of the double disadvantage of wide spread illiteracy and the rarity of books. Those who could read and had access to books, including the bible, were almost all Classically educated. Meaning that they were taught that Socrates, Aristotle and Plato were the greatest minds the world has ever produced and they interpreted the bible from the perspective of Greek philosophy and taught the resulting doctrines to their mostly illiterate church members.

The printing press started to undermine long standing dogma almost immediately, which is why you aren't a Catholic.

but to your point you mean what the bible teaches ,

(Romans 8:29) For whom he foreknew, he also foreordained to be conformed to the image of his Son, that he might be the firstborn among many brethren
(Jeremiah 1:5) Before I formed thee in the belly I knew thee, and before thou camest forth out of the womb I sanctified thee; I have appointed thee a prophet unto the nations

do open theist have a book of Daniel or do you just tear that one out ?

Yes. We routinely rip out the books Daniel and Revelation focus only on books like Jonah where prophecies don't come to pass.

Idiot!

it's irrational to say God knows all that is knowable then deny it

I do not say that God knows all that is knowable.

I say that God knows all that is knowable that He wants to know and that he is able to discover anything he needs to know.

God knew sodom was evil but didn't know sodom was evil , ah the special pleading

Special pleading! What a ridiculous thing to say! You need to read a book about the nature and use of logic and the basics of epistemology. You make yourself sound like a slobbering moron.

Here's a good one to start with...

50 Philosophy Ideas You Really Need to Know by Ben Dupré



The bible itself EXPLICITLY states that God was going to investigate Sodom to see whether it was as bad as He had been told. How much more evidence could any honest mind need? I mean it is as explicitly clear as it can possibly be!

'if you ignore all the verses that infer\teach omniscience then there are no verses that infer\teach omniscience '
Neo in the matrix
uh no that was about a spoon ¯\_(ツ)_/¯

I do not ignore that which does not exist. There is no such thing as a verse of scripture that teaches any of the classical omni-doctrines. Such doctrines MUST be brought to the reading of scripture a priori and read into the passages that are commonly used as proof-texts. There are no exceptions.

but those verses were about omnipresence , as in God didn't need to go to sodom to know if it was evil

No, they aren't about omnipresence. You read that into the text. You look at the sky with dark red tinted glasses and say, "See! The sky is black!"

¯\(°_o)/¯
Revelation 4:1

Here's a clue...

God can predict the future without having to be outside of time, omniscient, omnipresent or omni-anything.

bonus clue...

Prophesy does not always come to pass! There are lots of examples of such in the same bible you've been taught teaches the opposite.

 

[JudgeRightly]

precedent which has not been overthrown by heterodox open theism

Answered in posts #210, #211, #216, #230, and #235.

Calling your view “precedent” and calling Open Theism “heterodox” does not prove anything. That is still appeal to tradition.

open theism infers not only does God not know the knowable he is not omnipresent

Answered in posts #216, #229, #230, #232, and #235.

Open Theism says God knows all that is knowable. The disagreement is over whether future free choices already exist as settled facts to be known before they are made.

I know until open theism came along everyone got it wrong.

Answered in posts #210, #211, #216, #230, and #235.

Again, appeal to tradition.

“Open Theism” is the modern label, not the invention of the idea that God is free, that men make real choices, and that the future is not exhaustively settled before those choices are made. You are confusing the age of a term with the age of the doctrine, and even if the label were recent, that still would not prove the position false. The question is what Scripture teaches, not which theological nickname is oldest.

but to your point you mean what the bible teaches ,

(Romans 8:29) For whom he foreknew, he also foreordained to be conformed to the image of his Son, that he might be the firstborn among many brethren

Romans 8:29 says “whom He foreknew,” not “every future free choice He exhaustively foreknew.”

Paul is talking about the group God foreknew and predestined in Christ: those who are in Him will be conformed to the image of His Son. The passage does not say God exhaustively foreknew every future free act of every individual before creation, nor does it say Abraham’s obedience in Genesis 22 was already known before the test.

So if this is supposed to prove exhaustive infallible foreknowledge of every future free choice, you still need to supply the missing argument, because “God foreknew the destiny of those in Christ” is not the same thing as “God exhaustively foreknew every future choice of every person.”

(Jeremiah 1:5) Before I formed thee in the belly I knew thee, and before thou camest forth out of the womb I sanctified thee; I have appointed thee a prophet unto the nations

Jeremiah 1:5 says God knew Jeremiah, sanctified him, and appointed him as a prophet before he was born.

Amen.

But “before birth” is not the same thing as “before conception,” much less “before creation.” Once Jeremiah existed in the womb, God could know him, form him, appoint him, and plan around his life. None of that requires God to have exhaustively foreknown every future free choice Jeremiah would ever make, much less every future free choice of every person who would ever live.

God knowing and appointing Jeremiah for a prophetic role before birth is not the same thing as exhaustive infallible foreknowledge of all future contingencies.

do open theist have a book of Daniel or do you just tear that one out ?

Name the passage and make the argument.

Open Theists affirm prophecy. God can declare what He intends to do, what He will bring about by His own power, what will happen if men continue in rebellion, and what He knows from present conditions and His own plans.

What you need to prove is not “the Bible contains prophecy.” Everyone here already believes that.

What you need to prove is that prophecy requires exhaustive infallible foreknowledge of every future free choice. So cite the Daniel passage you have in mind and show how it proves that.

it's irrational to say God knows all that is knowable then deny it

Answered in posts #207, #211, #216, #227, #230, #232, and #235.

You keep repeating the same confusion. Open Theism does not deny that God knows all that is knowable. It denies that future free choices are already settled facts before they are made.

God knew sodom was evil but didn't know sodom was evil , ah the special pleading

Answered in posts #211, #216, #229, #232, and #235.

Genesis 13:13 says Sodom was wicked generally. Genesis 18:21 concerns a specific outcry that God says He will investigate: “I will go down now and see... and if not, I will know.” Genesis 19:13 occurs after that investigation.

Also, notice the phrase, “the outcry against it that has come to Me.”

That is not how the passage would naturally read if God were timelessly outside the sequence, already beholding every fact as eternally settled. The outcry “came” to Him, and in response He says He will go down and see whether they have done according to that outcry, “and if not, I will know.”

That is how normal language works because the text is describing real sequence: outcry comes to God, God responds, God investigates, God judges. Your view has to flatten all of that into “God already knew,” but the passage itself does not speak that way.

You are still flattening different claims into one and then accusing me of special pleading for reading the sequence in order.

'if you ignore all the verses that infer\teach omniscience then there are no verses that infer\teach omniscience '
Neo in the matrix
uh no that was about a spoon ¯(ツ)/¯

Answered in posts #207, #211, #216, #227, #230, #232, and #235.

This is question-begging.

You are treating “the Bible teaches omniscience” as though it automatically means “the Bible teaches my definition of omniscience,” and then accusing me of ignoring verses about God’s knowledge because I reject your definition.

That is not an argument.

I affirm that God knows all that is knowable. The dispute is whether future free choices are already settled facts before they are made. Quoting verses that teach God’s knowledge does not prove that future contingencies already exist as settled facts, nor does it prove exhaustive infallible foreknowledge of every future free choice.

but those verses were about omnipresence , as in God didn't need to go to sodom to know if it was evil

Answered in posts #216, #229, #232, and #235.

Even if you want to use Jeremiah 23 and Psalm 139 as omnipresence texts (and for the record, they are not), they still do not make Genesis 18:21 say the opposite of what it says. Your theology needs “I will know” to mean “I already knew.” The text says, “I will know.”

¯(°_o)/¯
Revelation 4:1

Answered in posts #207, #211, #216, #227, #230, and #235.

Revelation 4:1 says God would show John what “must occur.” That proves prophecy. It does not prove exhaustive infallible foreknowledge of every future free choice.

“Must occur” can mean these things must occur because God will bring His prophetic program to completion. It does not mean every contingent detail is eternally fixed as prewritten history.

Revelation gives the prophetic outline of what God will bring about. It is not a philosophical treatise proving exhaustive infallible foreknowledge of every future free choice.

 

[Right Divider]

Gen 11:5 (AKJV/PCE)
(11:5) And the LORD came down to see the city and the tower, which the children of men builded.

Exod 33:14 (AKJV/PCE)
(33:14) And he said, My presence shall go [with thee], and I will give thee rest.

Lev 22:3 (AKJV/PCE)
(22:3) Say unto them, Whosoever [he be] of all your seed among your generations, that goeth unto the holy things, which the children of Israel hallow unto the LORD, having his uncleanness upon him, that soul shall be cut off from my presence: I [am] the LORD.

Jer 23:39 (AKJV/PCE)
(23:39) Therefore, behold, I, even I, will utterly forget you, and I will forsake you, and the city that I gave you and your fathers, [and cast you] out of my presence:

 

[JudgeRightly]

Shawn loves ketchup on his hotdogs. At today's graduation cookout there will be grilled meats—hotdogs, burgers, steak tips, marinated chicken. Shawn prefers hotdogs over everything else.

Fine.

Preferences influence choices. No one denies that.

It is settled: Shawn is getting a hotdog, and he is putting ketchup on it. He COULD choose something else—there's mayo, mustard, relish, chili, onions, and plenty of other meats—but he’s not going to. He has already made up his mind. It's fixed. Hotdog, ketchup.

This is where the equivocation starts.

“Shawn has made up his mind” is not the same thing as “Shawn’s choice was exhaustively and infallibly foreknown before he made it.”

If “settled” means Shawn presently intends to eat a ketchup hotdog, fine. That does not destroy his freedom, because he could still change his mind. Men change their minds all the time.

And that is the key difference. Shawn is not infallible. His “knowledge” of what he will do is really a present intention, preference, or expectation about his own future behavior. He can be wrong. He can change his mind. Something can intervene.

But the classical claim is not merely that God has a strong expectation about what Shawn will do. The claim is that God infallibly knows the future act. That means the act cannot fail to occur without making God’s knowledge false.

So in the context of this thread, “settled” means unable to be otherwise because of necessity. That is the whole point of the foreknowledge argument. If God infallibly knows Shawn will eat the ketchup hotdog, then Shawn’s eating the ketchup hotdog is necessary in the relevant sense: it cannot fail to occur without making God’s knowledge false.

You cannot move from “a fallible man has made up his mind” to “God infallibly foreknows every future free choice” as though those are the same thing. If Shawn can actually do otherwise, then the outcome is not infallibly fixed. If the outcome is infallibly fixed, then Shawn cannot actually do otherwise.

Does the fact that this is settled destroy Shawn's freedom? is he now a robot with no real choice? ofc not. The settled outcome doesn’t remove his ability to choose differently. It just means he WON'T.

“Won’t” and “can’t” are the whole issue.

If Shawn simply will not choose otherwise because he has a strong preference and a present intention, then that is not exhaustive infallible foreknowledge.

But if God infallibly knows Shawn will eat the ketchup hotdog, then Shawn cannot fail to eat the ketchup hotdog, because if he did otherwise God’s knowledge would be false.

The question is whether Shawn has a genuine alternative, not whether he's a robot.

If he can choose otherwise, then the alleged foreknowledge can be false.

If he cannot choose otherwise, then the alternative is not genuinely possible.

Now say God 'happens by' and sees the whole situation. To us it looks like God foresees Shawn eating a ketchup hotdog. To God it is simply sight—He sees what Shawn has settled on. He has searched Shawn's heart and sees the event is fixed in Shawn's heart, so it is fixed in reality. This is classical theism, and I find it a remarkably modest claim.

No, that is not classical theism. That is God observing a present intention after Shawn has already made up his mind.

And I have no problem with God knowing what Shawn has presently settled in his own heart. Once Shawn exists, has preferences, faces a real situation, and makes up his mind, there is something there for God to know.

But that is not the same as God exhaustively and infallibly knowing Shawn’s future free choice before Shawn made it, much less before Shawn existed.

You moved from “God sees what Shawn has settled on” to “therefore exhaustive infallible foreknowledge is true,” but those are not the same claim.

God knowing a present settled intention is not the same thing as every future free choice being settled before it is made.

The Open Theist says that if the outcome is settled in advance, then Shawn's freedom has been destroyed and he is turned into a puppet. That strikes me as the much more ambitious (and strained) claim.

No, the Open Theist says that if the outcome is infallibly settled before the choice is made, then the alternative cannot actually occur.

That is not ambitious. That is basic logic.

If Shawn can choose mustard instead, then ketchup was not infallibly settled.

If ketchup was infallibly settled, then Shawn cannot choose mustard instead.

Your analogy only works by changing the meaning of “settled” halfway through. In one sense, “settled” means Shawn has made up his own mind. In the other sense, “settled” means the outcome cannot fail to happen because it is infallibly known.

Those are not the same thing.

A man deciding what he will do is not the same as his future act being exhaustively and infallibly known as settled before he decides.

 

[Derf]

Shawn loves ketchup on his hotdogs. At today's graduation cookout there will be grilled meats—hotdogs, burgers, steak tips, marinated chicken. Shawn prefers hotdogs over everything else.

It is settled: Shawn is getting a hotdog, and he is putting ketchup on it. He COULD choose something else—there's mayo, mustard, relish, chili, onions, and plenty of other meats—but he’s not going to. He has already made up his mind. It's fixed. Hotdog, ketchup.

Does the fact that this is settled destroy Shawn's freedom? is he now a robot with no real choice? ofc not. The settled outcome doesn’t remove his ability to choose differently.

The difference is who settles it. If it is known from the foundation of the world, or even from 100 years before Shawn was born, then Shawn is not the one making the choice. He can't be, because he didn't exist.

It just means he WON'T.

Now say God 'happens by' and sees the whole situation.

You mean God "happened by before the foundation of the world and sees the whole situation." This is crucial to understand the equivocation here. We don't deny that God can "search Shawn's heart" and see what his likes and dislikes are. But if God sees, BEFORE SHAWN EXISTED, Shawn's likes and dislikes to the point where there is no chance Shawn will choose anything but a hotdog and ketchup on that particular day then Shawn was created with those particular strong desires that he can't overcome--he was "decreed" to pick a hot dog and ketchup on that day.

To us it looks like God foresees Shawn eating a ketchup hotdog. To God it is simply sight—He sees what Shawn has settled on. He has searched Shawn's heart

He has searched Shawn's heart before Shawn had a heart? I can't stress the importance of this concept enough. If God's knowledge didn't change about what Shawn would do after Shawn was conceived, then you can't just assume God is searching his heart the day before the picnic to find out what he's going to eat.

and sees the event is fixed in Shawn's heart,

Before Shawn's heart existed???

so it is fixed in reality.

Shawn's heart's likes and dislikes are fixed in reality before the foundation of the world??? This is Calvinism.

This is classical theism, and I find it a remarkably modest claim.

It might be classical theism, but it is also Calvinism. And I thought you had rejected Calvinism.

The Open Theist says that if the outcome is settled in advance,

Before the foundation of the world! Before Shawn and his heart existed (not to mention before his parents and grandparents existed, and before his chromosomes and DNA and whatever else existed that might affect his choices of food).

then Shawn's freedom has been destroyed and he is turned into a puppet.

Yes, because before Shawn existed, all of his choices were determined by somebody besides Shawn, and Shawn had no say in it (because he didn't exist).

That strikes me as the much more ambitious (and strained) claim.

I can't see how, since it is not normal that someone's choices can be made before he exists, and yet you think he was the one making the choices.