Constitutional Monarchy

JudgeRightly

裁判官が正しく判断する
Staff member
Administrator
Super Moderator
Gold Subscriber
I'm a little at a loss for words here. You spent all that time and effort arguing against a position that I do not hold and that I have not argued. I cannot understand how it is possible for you to have missed the point so completely! You've taken what amounts to a colloquial reference to Israel, which I employed because they are the one's in the bible who had a kingdom similar to the one we are here discussing, and taken that and exploded it into something that I don't even think you have any cause to suspect that I was arguing.

You seem to be under the impressing that I am claiming that every feature of Israel's kingdom is universally binding. That isn't at all what I am arguing. Such an argument would require that I advocate for far more alterations to Bob's proposal than just a royal removal system. Not only that, but such a claim would be false on its face and entirely indefensible. You, however, posit that as my central thesis and then spend I don't know how many hundreds of words explaining how Israel had unique covenantal features that Gentile nations need not reproduce. All of which may be true, but none of which addresses the argument I actually made.

Fair enough. Given this clarification, I overstated your position when I formulated premise I(2) as the claim that every integral feature of Israel’s governmental order is universally necessary.

However, I inferred that position from your repeated identification of Israel’s kingdom with “the biblical model,” together with your claim that Bob had omitted a major integral feature of that model. Your clarification narrows the argument considerably, so I withdraw that formulation of your premise.

As I now understand it, your argument is that God’s oversight performed an essential function in Israel, modern governments lack that function, and its absence leaves a structural gap that every modern proposal must address.

That narrower argument still contains the central disputed inference.

My argument consists basically of the following five points...

  • God's active oversight performed an essential function in Israel government. (not in dispute)
  • Removing that function necessarily changes the governmental structure. (true by definition)
  • Because God's oversight cannot be reproduced, every modern proposal must decide what to do about the resulting structural gap.
  • Ignoring that gap is itself one possible adaptation; attempting to address it is another.
  • Therefore, the real debate is not whether adaptation is necessary, but which adaptation is preferable.

Your position is to ignore the vacancy, mine is the opposite.

I agree with your first two points.

God’s active oversight performed an essential function within Israel’s governmental order. Removing that function necessarily produces a governmental structure different from Israel’s complete historical structure.

Your third point sneaks in an additional, unestablished premise. A difference between two structures establishes a structural gap only when the absent feature is necessary to the proper operation of both structures.

That remains to be shown.

God’s direct oversight may have been essential to Israel’s particular covenantal government while remaining unnecessary to legitimate Gentile government. Sections II and III of my formal argument addressed precisely that distinction.

Calling the absence a “gap” or “vacancy” assumes that Bob’s structure contains a position formerly occupied by God’s direct oversight and that some modern institution must now fill it.

You therefore need to demonstrate:

(1) What exact function of God’s oversight created the alleged vacancy?

(2) Why is that function necessary to just monarchy generally rather than to Israel’s particular covenantal administration?

(3) How does a standing human tribunal empowered to remove the king perform that function?

God’s oversight of Israel included selecting and rejecting kings, delivering direct revelation, enforcing His covenant, judging royal houses, directing national events, and preserving the Davidic and messianic line.

Your tribunal performs a much narrower function. It gives ordinary men jurisdiction to prosecute, judge, and remove the king.

The impossibility of reproducing God’s oversight does not establish that a human removal tribunal supplies an equivalent function. Describing your proposal as filling a vacancy first requires proof that the vacancy exists and that the institution fits it.

Your position also appears to be that no constitutional system can be designed in which the highest civil authority is constitutionally accountable to the law. If that is so, then your system is just as defeated as mine. If we're both counting by zeros then what's the point? If it can't be done then it can't be done. Assuming this position is true, then one system is simply different than the other and it becomes a matter of personal preference, not reason and justice and you've lost the basis for saying my proposal is wrong. At most you've explained why you prefer yours.

That depends upon what you mean by “constitutionally accountable to the law.”

Bob’s constitution binds the king to known law, assigns him defined duties, makes his actions publicly recordable, obligates subordinates to refuse unlawful commands, and leaves responsibility for the condition of the kingdom visibly upon him.

You appear to be using “constitutionally accountable” more narrowly to mean subject to prosecution and removal by another domestic authority.

Under that definition, the highest civil authority cannot remain the highest civil authority. Some higher institution must possess authority to judge and remove him.

The reasoning proceeds recursively:

  1. The king is designated as the final earthly authority.
  2. Under your definition of constitutional accountability, an authority possessing final and enforceable jurisdiction over another civil authority must itself be subject to an enforceable domestic check.
  3. Therefore, an institution must be established with authority to judge and remove the king.
    [1, 2]
  4. An institution possessing the final power to determine whether the king remains king exercises final earthly authority in that decisive jurisdiction.
  5. Therefore, the removal institution must itself be subject to another enforceable domestic check.
    [2, 4]
  6. The checking institution then occupies the same position described in premise (4), causing the reasoning to repeat.

The sequence either continues indefinitely or terminates in an authority that no higher domestic institution can judge or remove.

The first outcome produces an infinite regress. The second concedes that final earthly authority must terminate somewhere. Once that is conceded, the added hierarchy is redundant with respect to the stated purpose of placing every final authority under an enforceable domestic check, since Bob’s proposal already terminates final earthly authority openly in the king.

Allowing the chain to return to the king creates a circular structure that can deadlock. A removal body may seek to remove the king, a higher body may check that body, and the king may possess authority over the higher body and disable it to prevent the original proceeding from reaching him. Each institution can obstruct the others, leaving no clear point of final decision.

This is the “who watches the watchers?” problem addressed in points 2, 3, and 12 of post #489.

The available choices for your system therefore remain:

  • The removal institution possesses final authority over whether the king remains king, without any higher domestic institution capable of enforcing accountability against it;
  • some still higher institution possesses authority over the removers, which repeats the problem; or
  • the chain of authority eventually returns to the king, creating a circular structure and preventing the removal process from functioning as an independent check.

You are welcome to provide another alternative, but those appear to be the only possibilities within your system. Bob’s proposal terminates final earthly authority openly in one visible and mortal king. Your proposal terminates it in whichever men ultimately control the removal process.

The conclusion that this difference amounts only to personal preference does not follow. As argued in points 3, 9, and 10 of post #489, and again in posts #493 and #496, the structures can be compared according to jurisdiction, accountability, susceptibility to capture, institutional permanence, and their consequences under righteous and wicked officeholders.

Your proposal retains the danger of a sinful king while adding a permanent institution capable of controlling him and successive kings. It therefore compounds the problem of sinful authority, sacrifices several benefits of concentrated royal authority, and adds substantial constitutional machinery to address an exceptional case.

Governmental structure should be no more complex than its legitimate functions require. Every additional office, procedure, and layer of review consumes resources, divides responsibility, and creates another potential point of institutional capture.

The proposed benefit is narrow and depends upon righteous administration of the process, while the added structure creates problems of jurisdiction, divided authority, institutional capture, and procedural overhead.
 

Clete

Truth Smacker
Silver Subscriber
Fair enough. Given this clarification, I overstated your position when I formulated premise I(2) as the claim that every integral feature of Israel’s governmental order is universally necessary.

However, I inferred that position from your repeated identification of Israel’s kingdom with “the biblical model,” together with your claim that Bob had omitted a major integral feature of that model. Your clarification narrows the argument considerably, so I withdraw that formulation of your premise.

As I now understand it, your argument is that God’s oversight performed an essential function in Israel, modern governments lack that function, and its absence leaves a structural gap that every modern proposal must address.

That narrower argument still contains the central disputed inference.



I agree with your first two points.

God’s active oversight performed an essential function within Israel’s governmental order. Removing that function necessarily produces a governmental structure different from Israel’s complete historical structure.

Your third point sneaks in an additional, unestablished premise. A difference between two structures establishes a structural gap only when the absent feature is necessary to the proper operation of both structures.

That remains to be shown.

God’s direct oversight may have been essential to Israel’s particular covenantal government while remaining unnecessary to legitimate Gentile government. Sections II and III of my formal argument addressed precisely that distinction.

Calling the absence a “gap” or “vacancy” assumes that Bob’s structure contains a position formerly occupied by God’s direct oversight and that some modern institution must now fill it.

You therefore need to demonstrate:

(1) What exact function of God’s oversight created the alleged vacancy?

(2) Why is that function necessary to just monarchy generally rather than to Israel’s particular covenantal administration?

(3) How does a standing human tribunal empowered to remove the king perform that function?

God’s oversight of Israel included selecting and rejecting kings, delivering direct revelation, enforcing His covenant, judging royal houses, directing national events, and preserving the Davidic and messianic line.

Your tribunal performs a much narrower function. It gives ordinary men jurisdiction to prosecute, judge, and remove the king.

The impossibility of reproducing God’s oversight does not establish that a human removal tribunal supplies an equivalent function. Describing your proposal as filling a vacancy first requires proof that the vacancy exists and that the institution fits it.



That depends upon what you mean by “constitutionally accountable to the law.”

Bob’s constitution binds the king to known law, assigns him defined duties, makes his actions publicly recordable, obligates subordinates to refuse unlawful commands, and leaves responsibility for the condition of the kingdom visibly upon him.

You appear to be using “constitutionally accountable” more narrowly to mean subject to prosecution and removal by another domestic authority.

Under that definition, the highest civil authority cannot remain the highest civil authority. Some higher institution must possess authority to judge and remove him.

The reasoning proceeds recursively:

  1. The king is designated as the final earthly authority.
  2. Under your definition of constitutional accountability, an authority possessing final and enforceable jurisdiction over another civil authority must itself be subject to an enforceable domestic check.
  3. Therefore, an institution must be established with authority to judge and remove the king.
    [1, 2]
  4. An institution possessing the final power to determine whether the king remains king exercises final earthly authority in that decisive jurisdiction.
  5. Therefore, the removal institution must itself be subject to another enforceable domestic check.
    [2, 4]
  6. The checking institution then occupies the same position described in premise (4), causing the reasoning to repeat.

The sequence either continues indefinitely or terminates in an authority that no higher domestic institution can judge or remove.

The first outcome produces an infinite regress. The second concedes that final earthly authority must terminate somewhere. Once that is conceded, the added hierarchy is redundant with respect to the stated purpose of placing every final authority under an enforceable domestic check, since Bob’s proposal already terminates final earthly authority openly in the king.

Allowing the chain to return to the king creates a circular structure that can deadlock. A removal body may seek to remove the king, a higher body may check that body, and the king may possess authority over the higher body and disable it to prevent the original proceeding from reaching him. Each institution can obstruct the others, leaving no clear point of final decision.

This is the “who watches the watchers?” problem addressed in points 2, 3, and 12 of post #489.

The available choices for your system therefore remain:

  • The removal institution possesses final authority over whether the king remains king, without any higher domestic institution capable of enforcing accountability against it;
  • some still higher institution possesses authority over the removers, which repeats the problem; or
  • the chain of authority eventually returns to the king, creating a circular structure and preventing the removal process from functioning as an independent check.

You are welcome to provide another alternative, but those appear to be the only possibilities within your system. Bob’s proposal terminates final earthly authority openly in one visible and mortal king. Your proposal terminates it in whichever men ultimately control the removal process.

The conclusion that this difference amounts only to personal preference does not follow. As argued in points 3, 9, and 10 of post #489, and again in posts #493 and #496, the structures can be compared according to jurisdiction, accountability, susceptibility to capture, institutional permanence, and their consequences under righteous and wicked officeholders.

Your proposal retains the danger of a sinful king while adding a permanent institution capable of controlling him and successive kings. It therefore compounds the problem of sinful authority, sacrifices several benefits of concentrated royal authority, and adds substantial constitutional machinery to address an exceptional case.

Governmental structure should be no more complex than its legitimate functions require. Every additional office, procedure, and layer of review consumes resources, divides responsibility, and creates another potential point of institutional capture.

The proposed benefit is narrow and depends upon righteous administration of the process, while the added structure creates problems of jurisdiction, divided authority, institutional capture, and procedural overhead.
First of all, I want to say that I appreciate your acknowledgment that you overstated my position. That was the central problem with your previous response, and I'm glad we've gotten that behind us. That single issue would have tied up the whole discussion for weeks if it had been almost anyone else on this forum. I love it when a discussion can make actual progress! Unfortunately, there are still a few things that you're not getting quite right and which is causing you to spend a lot of time and energy in unnecessary directions.

You keep referring to a "standing tribunal," a "removal tribunal," and a "permanent institution" whose purpose is to judge and remove the king. Those are your terms, not mine. I have never proposed a permanently existing body whose constitutional purpose is to remove rogue kings. I have proposed a constitutional process for dealing with the extraordinary circumstance of a king accused of serious criminal conduct. Those are not the same thing. If you believe my proposal necessarily requires a permanently constituted body that possesses continuous jurisdiction over the king, then demonstrate that. As it is, you're simply redefining my proposal and then reacting to the redefined version.

The bigger problem, though, is that you're still not addressing the argument I'm actually making.

You treat God's oversight of Israel as though it were one indivisible thing. You list everything God did for Israel, (e.g. selecting kings, rejecting kings, sending prophets, giving revelation, judging royal houses, preserving the Davidic line, directing national events, and so forth), and then conclude that my proposal cannot replace God's oversight. Of course it can't. I have never argued that it could and that is not my argument.

God's oversight performed many different functions. That much is not in dispute, but I am only talking about one of them. Among the things God's oversight accomplished was providing a means by which a king who persisted in rebellion against God and justice could ultimately be removed. That is the only aspect of God's oversight I have been discussing. My proposal is not an attempt to replace the whole of God's relationship with Israel's kingdom. It is an attempt to account for the absence of one governmental function.

In short, your response never addresses my actual claim. Instead of arguing that this particular function is unnecessary, you've argued that my proposal doesn't replace everything God did. That's not the same thing!

This is also what I mean by a structural gap. I am not saying that every feature of Israel's covenantal administration must somehow be reproduced. I am saying that one important governmental function formerly performed by God's direct oversight no longer exists. Every modern proposal has to decide what to do about that reality. Every modern proposal has to decide whether that function is essential to a just constitutional order. If it is, then some lawful substitute must be considered. If it is not, then its absence is of no constitutional significance. That is the question we're actually debating.

I also don't think you've answered the question that has been driving my position from the very beginning.

You point out that Bob's constitution binds the king to known law, defines his duties, makes his conduct publicly visible, and permits subordinates to refuse unlawful commands. I agree that those are all valuable protections. My question has never been whether the king has duties under the law. My question is what happens when he knowingly ignores those duties.

Suppose the king commits serious crimes, refuses correction, and simply continues ruling. What constitutional mechanism exists to enforce the law against such a king?

Your answer continues to be that any such mechanism would require another authority over the king, which raises the familiar question of who has authority over them. I understand the regress argument, but whether that argument ultimately succeeds or fails is not the point I'm making here.

My point is much simpler.

If your conclusion is correct, then every constitutional system necessarily contains a position where the law cannot ultimately be constitutionally enforced. If that limitation is unavoidable, then we've moved beyond arguing that my proposal is somehow unauthorized. We're now comparing two different responses to the same problem. Your proposal accepts the deficiency as unavoidable and leaves it unaddressed. Mine attempts to mitigate it.

If that's where we've arrived, then I don't think the real question is whether adaptation is necessary. We both agree that God's direct oversight cannot be reproduced in any absolute sense. The real question is whether a constitution should simply accept the loss of that governmental function or whether it should attempt to account for it in some lawful way.
 
Top