Question on Older Theology Thinking

Dale McClenning

New member
I have read that there was an older theological doctrine (at least 100 years I think) that was an alternative to the Free Will and Predestination debate. I am not sure what it entails and have lost my note to know what it was called. I am hoping it is not one of those that try to mash the two together is some way that violates the meanings of the words themselves (like 'you are free to chose but only have one option'). Does anyone know what I am referring to and a book that would lay out the doctrine? Thanks
 

Hoping

Well-known member
I have read that there was an older theological doctrine (at least 100 years I think) that was an alternative to the Free Will and Predestination debate. I am not sure what it entails and have lost my note to know what it was called. I am hoping it is not one of those that try to mash the two together is some way that violates the meanings of the words themselves (like 'you are free to chose but only have one option'). Does anyone know what I am referring to and a book that would lay out the doctrine? Thanks
Hi Dale.
Welcome to the site.
I don't have an answer for your quest, but anyone who fails to see we have free will doesn't seem to understand that we will be judged for OUR choices on the last day.
Not for God's choices, but our own choices.
This is how I see "predestination"...
If you choose not to brush your teeth, you are predestined to lose your teeth.
If we don't choose to turn from sin, we are predestined to perish in a lake of fire.
Our destiny is based on the choices we make.
 

Yorzhik

Well-known member
LIFETIME MEMBER
Hall of Fame
I have read that there was an older theological doctrine (at least 100 years I think) that was an alternative to the Free Will and Predestination debate. I am not sure what it entails and have lost my note to know what it was called. I am hoping it is not one of those that try to mash the two together is some way that violates the meanings of the words themselves (like 'you are free to chose but only have one option'). Does anyone know what I am referring to and a book that would lay out the doctrine? Thanks
Please clarify. It could be you are talking about something like the debate between the Arminians and the Calvinists. Is that correct?
 

Dale McClenning

New member
Please clarify. It could be you are talking about something like the debate between the Arminians and the Calvinists. Is that correct?
I am not sure. It was a very brief mention and seemed to imply that is used both free will and predestination but had no details. I know that isn't much to go on, sorry, but is about all I had. It was implied it had something to do with the Calvanists.
It seems that there are many theological ideas that have been left behind in history and can be hard to find a description.
 

Hoping

Well-known member
I am not sure. It was a very brief mention and seemed to imply that is used both free will and predestination but had no details. I know that isn't much to go on, sorry, but is about all I had. It was implied it had something to do with the Calvanists.
It seems that there are many theological ideas that have been left behind in history and can be hard to find a description.
Think of it this way.
If your topic is important to God, it will not be lost.
If it is not important to God, it will blow away with the rest of the dust of man's invention.
 

Catholic Crusader

Kyrie Eleison
Banned
I have read that there was an older theological doctrine (at least 100 years I think) that was an alternative to the Free Will and Predestination debate. I am not sure what it entails and have lost my note to know what it was called. I am hoping it is not one of those that try to mash the two together is some way that violates the meanings of the words themselves (like 'you are free to chose but only have one option'). Does anyone know what I am referring to and a book that would lay out the doctrine? Thanks

100 years? With respect my friend, lets go back 1,600 years to St Augustine:

Among the early Fathers of the Church, St. Augustine stands preeminent in his handling of this subject. He clearly teaches the freedom of the will against the Manichaeans, but insists against the Semi Pelagians on the necessity of grace, as a foundation of merit. He also emphasizes very strongly the absolute rule of God over men’s wills by His omnipotence and omniscience—through the infinite store, as it were, of motives which He has had at His disposal from all eternity, and by the foreknowledge of those to which the will of each human being would freely consent. St. Augustine’s teaching formed the basis of much of the later theology of the Church on these questions, though other writers have sought to soften the more rigorous portions of his doctrine. This they did especially in opposition to heretical authors, who exaggerated these features in the works of the great African Doctor and attempted to deduce from his principles a form of rigid predeterminism little differing from fatalism. The teaching of St. Augustine is developed by St. Thomas Aquinas both in theology and philosophy. Will is rational appetite. Man necessarily desires beatitude, but he can freely choose between different forms of it. Free will is simply this elective power. Infinite Good is not visible to the intellect in this life. There are always some drawbacks and deficiencies in every good presented to us. None of them exhausts our intellectual capacity of conceiving the good. Consequently, in deliberate volition, not one of them completely satiates or irresistibly entices the will. In this capability of the intellect for conceiving the universal lies the root of our freedom. But God possess an infallible knowledge of man’s future actions. How is this prevision possible, if man’s future acts are not necessary? God does not exist in time. The future and the past are alike ever present to the eternal mind. As a man gazing down from a lofty mountain takes in at one momentary glance all the objects which can be apprehended only through a lengthy series of successive experiences by travellers along the winding road beneath, in somewhat similar fashion the intuitive vision of God apprehends simultaneously what is future to us with all it contains. Further, God‘s omnipotent providence exercises a complete and perfect control over all events that happen, or will happen, in the universe. How is this secured without infringement of man’s freedom? Here is the problem which two distinguished schools in the Church—both claiming to represent the teaching, or at any rate the logical development of the teaching of St. Thomas—attempt to solve in different ways. The heresies of Luther and Calvin brought the issue to a finer point than it had reached in the time of Aquinas, consequently he had not formally dealt with it in its ultimate shape, and each of the two schools can cite texts from the works of the Angelic Doctor in which he appears to incline towards their particular view.

Then we can go back 800 years to St Thomas Aquinas:

The Dominican or Thomist solution, as it is called, teaches in brief that God premoves each man in all his acts to the line of conduct which he subsequently adopts. It holds that this premotive decree inclines man’s will with absolute certainty to the side decreed, but that God adapts this premotion to the nature of the being thus premoved. It argues that as God possesses infinite power He can infallibly premove man—who is by nature a free cause—to choose a particular course freely, whilst He premoves the lower animals in harmony with their natures to adopt particular courses by necessity. Further, this premotive decree being inevitable, though adapted to suit the free nature of man, provides a medium in which God foresees with certainty the future free choice of the human being. The premotive decree is thus prior in order of thought to the Divine cognition of man’s future actions. Theologians and philosophers of the Jesuit School, frequently styled Molinists, though they do not accept the whole of Molina’s teaching and generally prefer Suarez’s exposition of the theory, deem the above solution unsatisfactory. It would, they readily admit, provide sufficiently for the infallibility of the Divine foreknowledge and also for God‘s providential control of the world’s history; but, in their view, it fails to give at the same time an adequately intelligible account of the freedom of the human will. According to them, the relation of the Divine action to man’s will should be conceived rather as of a concurrent than of a premotive character; and they maintain that God‘s knowledge of what a free being would choose, if the necessary conditions were supplied, must be deemed logically prior to any decree of concurrence or premotion in respect to that act of choice. Briefly, they make a threefold distinction in God‘s knowledge of the universe based on the nature of the objects known—the Divine knowledge being in itself of course absolutely simple. Objects or events viewed merely as possible, God is said to apprehend by simple intelligence (simplex intelligentia). Events which will happen He knows by vision (scientia visionis). Intermediate between these are conditionally future events—things which would occur were certain conditions fulfilled. God‘s knowledge of this class of contingencies they term scientia media. For instance Christ affirmed that, if certain miracles had been wrought in Tyre and Sidon, the inhabitants would have been converted. The condition was not realized, yet the statement of Christ must have been true. About all such conditional contingencies propositions may be framed which are either true or false—and Infinite Intelligence must know all truth. The conditions in many cases will not be realized, so God must know them apart from any decrees determining their realization. He knows them therefore, this school holds, in seipsis, in themselves as conditionally future events. This knowledge is the scientia media, “middle knowledge”, intermediate between vision of the actual future and simple understanding of the merely possible. Acting now in the light of this scientia media with respect to human volitions, God freely decides according to His own wisdom whether He shall supply the requisite conditions, including His cooperation in the action, or abstain from so doing, and thus render possible or prevent the realization of the event. In other words, the infinite intelligence of God sees clearly what would happen in any conceivable circumstances. He thus knows what the free will of any creature would choose, if supplied with the power of volition or choice and placed in any given circumstances. He now decrees to supply the needed conditions, including His concursus, or to abstain from so doing. He thus holds complete dominion and control over our future free actions, as well as over those of a necessary character. The Molinist then claims to safeguard better man’s freedom by substituting for the decree of an inflexible premotion one of concurrence dependent on God‘s prior knowledge of what the free being would choose, if given the power to exert the choice. He argues that he exempts God more clearly from all responsibility for man’s sins. The claim seems to the present writer well founded; at the same time it is only fair to record on the other side that the Thomist urges with considerable force that God‘s prescience is not so understandable in this, as in his theory. He maintains, too, that God‘s exercise of His absolute dominion over all man’s acts and man’s entire dependence on God‘s goodwill are more impressively and more worthily exhibited in the premotion hypothesis. The reader will find an exhaustive treatment of the question in any of the Scholastic textbooks on the subject.

Source link
 

JudgeRightly

裁判官が正しく判断する
Staff member
Administrator
Super Moderator
Gold Subscriber
100 years? With respect my friend, lets go back 1,600 years to St Augustine:

Among the early Fathers of the Church, St. Augustine stands preeminent in his handling of this subject. He clearly teaches the freedom of the will against the Manichaeans, but insists against the Semi Pelagians on the necessity of grace, as a foundation of merit. He also emphasizes very strongly the absolute rule of God over men’s wills by His omnipotence and omniscience—through the infinite store, as it were, of motives which He has had at His disposal from all eternity, and by the foreknowledge of those to which the will of each human being would freely consent. St. Augustine’s teaching formed the basis of much of the later theology of the Church on these questions, though other writers have sought to soften the more rigorous portions of his doctrine. This they did especially in opposition to heretical authors, who exaggerated these features in the works of the great African Doctor and attempted to deduce from his principles a form of rigid predeterminism little differing from fatalism. The teaching of St. Augustine is developed by St. Thomas Aquinas both in theology and philosophy. Will is rational appetite. Man necessarily desires beatitude, but he can freely choose between different forms of it. Free will is simply this elective power. Infinite Good is not visible to the intellect in this life. There are always some drawbacks and deficiencies in every good presented to us. None of them exhausts our intellectual capacity of conceiving the good. Consequently, in deliberate volition, not one of them completely satiates or irresistibly entices the will. In this capability of the intellect for conceiving the universal lies the root of our freedom. But God possess an infallible knowledge of man’s future actions. How is this prevision possible, if man’s future acts are not necessary? God does not exist in time. The future and the past are alike ever present to the eternal mind. As a man gazing down from a lofty mountain takes in at one momentary glance all the objects which can be apprehended only through a lengthy series of successive experiences by travellers along the winding road beneath, in somewhat similar fashion the intuitive vision of God apprehends simultaneously what is future to us with all it contains. Further, God‘s omnipotent providence exercises a complete and perfect control over all events that happen, or will happen, in the universe. How is this secured without infringement of man’s freedom? Here is the problem which two distinguished schools in the Church—both claiming to represent the teaching, or at any rate the logical development of the teaching of St. Thomas—attempt to solve in different ways. The heresies of Luther and Calvin brought the issue to a finer point than it had reached in the time of Aquinas, consequently he had not formally dealt with it in its ultimate shape, and each of the two schools can cite texts from the works of the Angelic Doctor in which he appears to incline towards their particular view.

Then we can go back 800 years to St Thomas Aquinas:

The Dominican or Thomist solution, as it is called, teaches in brief that God premoves each man in all his acts to the line of conduct which he subsequently adopts. It holds that this premotive decree inclines man’s will with absolute certainty to the side decreed, but that God adapts this premotion to the nature of the being thus premoved. It argues that as God possesses infinite power He can infallibly premove man—who is by nature a free cause—to choose a particular course freely, whilst He premoves the lower animals in harmony with their natures to adopt particular courses by necessity. Further, this premotive decree being inevitable, though adapted to suit the free nature of man, provides a medium in which God foresees with certainty the future free choice of the human being. The premotive decree is thus prior in order of thought to the Divine cognition of man’s future actions. Theologians and philosophers of the Jesuit School, frequently styled Molinists, though they do not accept the whole of Molina’s teaching and generally prefer Suarez’s exposition of the theory, deem the above solution unsatisfactory. It would, they readily admit, provide sufficiently for the infallibility of the Divine foreknowledge and also for God‘s providential control of the world’s history; but, in their view, it fails to give at the same time an adequately intelligible account of the freedom of the human will. According to them, the relation of the Divine action to man’s will should be conceived rather as of a concurrent than of a premotive character; and they maintain that God‘s knowledge of what a free being would choose, if the necessary conditions were supplied, must be deemed logically prior to any decree of concurrence or premotion in respect to that act of choice. Briefly, they make a threefold distinction in God‘s knowledge of the universe based on the nature of the objects known—the Divine knowledge being in itself of course absolutely simple. Objects or events viewed merely as possible, God is said to apprehend by simple intelligence (simplex intelligentia). Events which will happen He knows by vision (scientia visionis). Intermediate between these are conditionally future events—things which would occur were certain conditions fulfilled. God‘s knowledge of this class of contingencies they term scientia media. For instance Christ affirmed that, if certain miracles had been wrought in Tyre and Sidon, the inhabitants would have been converted. The condition was not realized, yet the statement of Christ must have been true. About all such conditional contingencies propositions may be framed which are either true or false—and Infinite Intelligence must know all truth. The conditions in many cases will not be realized, so God must know them apart from any decrees determining their realization. He knows them therefore, this school holds, in seipsis, in themselves as conditionally future events. This knowledge is the scientia media, “middle knowledge”, intermediate between vision of the actual future and simple understanding of the merely possible. Acting now in the light of this scientia media with respect to human volitions, God freely decides according to His own wisdom whether He shall supply the requisite conditions, including His cooperation in the action, or abstain from so doing, and thus render possible or prevent the realization of the event. In other words, the infinite intelligence of God sees clearly what would happen in any conceivable circumstances. He thus knows what the free will of any creature would choose, if supplied with the power of volition or choice and placed in any given circumstances. He now decrees to supply the needed conditions, including His concursus, or to abstain from so doing. He thus holds complete dominion and control over our future free actions, as well as over those of a necessary character. The Molinist then claims to safeguard better man’s freedom by substituting for the decree of an inflexible premotion one of concurrence dependent on God‘s prior knowledge of what the free being would choose, if given the power to exert the choice. He argues that he exempts God more clearly from all responsibility for man’s sins. The claim seems to the present writer well founded; at the same time it is only fair to record on the other side that the Thomist urges with considerable force that God‘s prescience is not so understandable in this, as in his theory. He maintains, too, that God‘s exercise of His absolute dominion over all man’s acts and man’s entire dependence on God‘s goodwill are more impressively and more worthily exhibited in the premotion hypothesis. The reader will find an exhaustive treatment of the question in any of the Scholastic textbooks on the subject.

Source link

Why not just read what Scripture says:

 

Catholic Crusader

Kyrie Eleison
Banned
Why not just read what Scripture says:

There are hundreds of protestant sects, all teaching different things, all promoting conflicting and contradictory doctrines, and they all say what you say: This is what the scripture says.

They all get it wrong, as do you.

Jesus chose men to teach, not books to hand out. Jesus established a Church, not a book.

Jesus established One, Holy, Catholic and Apostolic Church:: Men established sects and denominations and doctrines of men.

I leave you to your doctrines of men.
 

JudgeRightly

裁判官が正しく判断する
Staff member
Administrator
Super Moderator
Gold Subscriber
There are hundreds of protestant sects, all teaching different things, all promoting conflicting and contradictory doctrines, and they all say what you say: This is what the scripture says.

So you'll take what a church says over what scripture says, even though scripture is plain?

That's real smart.

They all get it wrong, as do you.

Prove it. You won't.

Jesus chose men to teach, not books to hand out. Jesus established a Church, not a book.

Which is why I said "recommend," not "requirement."

Jesus established One, Holy, Catholic and Apostolic Church:

Nope.

Jesus preached the gospel of the Kingdom, and built the church of Israel with Him being the foundation.

Then Israel (as a whole) ultimately rejected her Messiah, and so God cut Israel off (as He said he would) and grafted the Body of Christ in, a different church.

Men established sects and denominations and doctrines of men.

The Catholic church isn't innocent of this either.

I leave you to your doctrines of men.

Begging the question doesn't count as a valid argument.
 
Top