The Thomist does not say that God merely inspires our consent, as if implying that the consent to perform the salutary act comes solely from ourselves. That is, he doesn't just provides graces and waits for us to consent. There is a way in which the two views of efficacious grace are different.
I'm sure this is only a matter of perception....
NewAdvent.Org
Even Molinism must and does admit that the very idea of efficacious grace includes the free consent of the will, and also that the decree of God to bestow an efficacious grace upon a man involves with metaphysical certainty the free co-operation of the will. From this it follows that God must possess some infallible source of knowledge by means of which he knows from all eternity, with metaphysical certainty, whether in the future the will is going to co-operate with a given grace or to resist it. When the question has assumed this form, it is easy to see that the whole controversy resolves itself into a discussion on the foreknowledge which God has of the free future acts; and thus the two opposing systems on grace are ultimately founded upon the general doctrine on God and His attributes. Both systems are confronted with the wider and deeper question: What is the medium of knowledge (medium in quo) in which God foresees the (absolute or conditioned) free operations of His rational creatures? That there must be such a medium of Divine foreknowledge is evident. The Thomists answer: God foresees the (absolute and conditioned) free acts of man in the eternal decrees of His own will, which with absolute certainty produce prœmovendo as definite prœdeterminationcs ad unum, all (absolute and conditional) free operations. With the same absolute certainty with which He knows His own will, He also foresees clearly and distinctly in the decrees of His will all future acts of man. However, the Molinists maintain that, since, as we remarked above, the predetermining decrees of the Divine Will must logically and necessarily destroy freedom and lead to Determinism, they cannot possibly be the medium in which God infallibly foresees future free acts. Rather these decrees must presuppose a special knowledge (scientia media), in the light of which God infallibly foresees from all eternity what attitude man's will would in any conceivable combination of circumstances assume if this or that particular grace were offered it. And it is only when guided by His infallible foreknowledge that God determines the kind of grace He shall give to man. If, for example, He foresees by means of the scientia media that St. Peter, after his denial of Christ, shall freely co-operate with a certain grace, He decrees to give him this particular grace and none other; the grace thus conferred becomes efficacious in bringing about his repentance. In the case of Judas, on the other hand, God, foreseeing the future resistance of this Apostle to a certain grace of conversion, decreed to allow it, and consequently bestowed upon him a grace which in itself was really sufficient, but remained inefficacious solely on account of the refractory disposition of the Apostle's will. Guided by this scientia media God is left entirely free in the disposition and distribution of grace. On His good pleasure alone it depends to whom He will give the supreme grace of final perseverance, to whom He will refuse it; whom He will receive into Heaven, whom He will exclude from His sight for ever. This doctrine is in perfect harmony with the dogmas of the gratuity of grace, the unequal distribution of efficacious grace, the wise and inscrutable operations of Divine Providence, the absolute impossibility to merit final perseverance, and lastly the immutable predestination to glory or rejection; nay more, it brings these very dogmas into harmony, not only with the infallible foreknowledge of God, but also with the freedom of the created will.
So you see that Thomists along with Infra-Calvinists see God's knowledge as a result of His decrees; whereas, Molinist's see God's decrees founded on His knowledge. A minor point --- since God's Decree and Knowledge exist atemporally(or simultaneously) within His Divine Person(s).
Are we to claim, just as the 'ots' do that one of God's attributes takes precedence over another?
This becomes a debate over the logical order of events. I should point out that it's man's logical order, not Gods. Who's to say that God is unable to know the end from the beginning?
The Thomist holds that we have from God not only the will to do good (via sufficient grace) but also the actual act to accomplish the good that we will (via efficacious grace), as St. Paul states (Philippians 2:13). Since it is to God that we own all the good in us, there is nothing in us to boast about (Ephesians 2:8-9).
And where does the Molinist claim that man received the ability to do good from?
The Molinist view in contrast, given two men, each being allocated an equal amount of grace, it can come to pass that one man performs a salutary act and the other does not without receiving any further help from God. In this case the good in the man would not be something coming from God but from the man himself.
Well this might be true, but it would be more precise to say that God gives each man the amount of grace needed to be considered sufficient to the task of generating a positive response. The man's own nature, which was provided by God at the moment of conception per His Divine Act, was a Grace in and of itself. Combined these two Graces are sufficient to be effecacious. Neither alone will provide final perseverence. Both from God, neither originating from man. The question becomes, "Will the man exchange all that God has given him(freedom of action) to obtain the pearl of great price?".
This is a critical difference between both systems.
What is the significance of arguing over which attribute precedes the other? Is there an advantage in either system or are they both true like foreknowledge and free will being compatible?
Yes I am sure. Thomists also reject scientia media, which the Molinists accept. The Molinists reject the doctrine of the divine predetermining decrees and physical premotion of the Thomists, both of which I accept.
Absolutely not. Molinists accept predestination as fact and I explained above the 'physical premotion' of the Molinists.
I appreciate your teaching. Are we able to come to a concensus? I would say that the Church was correct in making both views acceptable and valid. Is there any reason to say that the Church was wrong in Her edict?
