Interaction with perfect foreknowledge?

[Clete]

Clete,

You're right, I did.....

I didn't say this before, but I'll say it now...I don't even see this passage as a prophecy so I definitely can't see it as an unfulfilled prophecy.

God said something would happen in the future. That sounds like a prophecy to me! What about it would disqualify it as a prophecy?

I still disagree that God either didn't know the future or was a liar.

On what basis do you disagree?

God said He would do it, it didn't happen, and God could have known it wasn't going to happen. God still said it even though He knew it wasn't going to happen, mainly for the same reason He didn't tell Jonah that the people of Nineveh would repent. If God let us know everything it would take the living out of life.

In my mind this is the equivalent of just coming right out and saying that God lies to us. This is simply not acceptable. How is this not a lie on God's part?
Further, if you want to talk about taking the living out of life, if God knows what I will do I cannot do otherwise and am therefore not free and therefore not able to excercise volition of any kind including love. All choice is an illusion if God knows the future exhaustively. No that's what I call taking the living out of life!

Resting in Him,
Clete

P.S. You should respond to post 69 while my boycott of eccl3_6 is still on hold!

 

[GuySmiley]

Y = a + bX.

What you are saying is that God's foreknowledge is not part of the equation. The decission is controled by only the variables you defined, and God's foreknowledge is not one of them. Right? So no matter if foreknowledge is present or not, it does not control the decission. Is that what you are saying?

I'm not agreeing, I'm just trying to understand what you wrote.

Edit: If so (the above). I think you set up the problem wrong. If foreknowledge exists, then no other outcome is possible. So God's foreknowledge has to be a variable if it exists. The variable of God's foreknowledge would always dictate the answer.

Greg

 

[docrob57]

What you are saying is that God's foreknowledge is not part of the equation. The decission is controled by only the variables you defined, and God's foreknowledge is not one of them. Right? So no matter if foreknowledge is present or not, it does not control the decission. Is that what you are saying?

I'm not agreeing, I'm just trying to understand what you wrote.

Greg

That is what I was saying! And by the way, used to love you on Sesame Street

 

[insolafide]

Have you ever read Divine Foreknowledge: Four Views?

In his opening paragraph to his response to the Middle-Knowledge View or Molinist View, Gregory Boyd said this...

Reading William Lane Craig's fine essay reminded me a just how close Molinism is to the open view. Indeed, I shall argue the view that has come to be labeled open theism could perhaps more accurately be labeled neo-Molinism. In essence it differs from the classical Molinist position only in that it expands the content of God's middle knowledge to include "might-counterfactuals." In this response I hope to show that this modification allows the open view to avoid problems which attend the classical Molinist view while preserving its explanatory power.
(from "Divine Foreknowledge: Four Views", page 144)​

If you have read it, I'd be interested in your thoughts concerning Boyd's response. If you haven't read it, you should.

Resting in Him,
Clete

I have read it (back when i was still green to Molinism). W.L. Craig's essays on this matter (and His Book, The Only Wise God) are part of the reason I am a Molinist, and oppose Open Theism. Boyd misunderstands the true Molinist scheme. Introducing might-counterfactuals into middle-knowledge completely unravels Molinism, it does not "add to it". The reason for that, is because Might-counterfactuals speak to a different part of the overall picture of truth, not the same. In other words, to say "George Bush might win the election" is to speak to the possibility of George Bush's winning (whether A state of affairs could obtain). It does not speak to the actualities (which state of affairs has obtained). In other words, to say that something might obtain under some set of circumstances is to remain silent about whether something would in fact obtain. So one could say BOTH "George Bush might win the election" and "George Bush would win the election". But then the would-counterfactual, if true, needs to also be known by God. The Molinist claims this is known pre-volitionally.

So then, might-counterfactuals become superfluous. Open theism completely misses the point on this matter - the question is whether or not would-counterfactuals are known by God. If God knows even one, then Molinism and not OT is correct.

In fact, the fact that God had/has knowledge of conditional future contingents was never even a disputed fact until the liberal theology of the 1900s (Schleirmacher). The dispute was always over "when" He had such knowlege.

So I would argue that the addition of Might-counterfactuals (in place of would-counterfactuals) are an attempt by open theism to converge God's Natural Knowledge with God's Middle-knowledge. This attempt is no small move, since the logical ordering (structure) in Molinism is precisely important.

Natural Knowledge ---> Middle Knowledge ---> (God's decree) ---> Free Knowledge

peace,
jd

 

[GuySmiley]

That is what I was saying! And by the way, used to love you on Sesame Street

Thanks, check the edit I did an that message and see what you think.

Greg

 

[insolafide]

I just started rereading the book. I concur that neo-Molinism has more strengths and less weaknesses than Molinism. The discussions in academic circles become very technical and beyond most of our expertise. If Molinism concludes that exhaustive foreknowledge is compatible with libertarian freedom, which I think it does, then it needs tweaking. "Middle knowledge" still should be considered possible vs actual before contingencies become certain after the choice (especially related to remote/distant vs proximal/near knowledge...God's perfect past and present knowledge make predictions more probable closer to actual choices).

Thats because you dont understand Molinism. You have demonstrated that already in another thread.

Since Molinism concludes that Exhaustive foreknowledge is compatible with libertarian freedom, and Has argumentation to prove so, then you need to demonstrate why this compatibility is an impossibility. Otherwise, Molinism wins, because it preserves Exhaustive foreknowledge (great making property) and Even Gives God augmented knowledge (knowledge of counterfactual realities) which is also a great-making property.

So lets see an argument why this compatibility fails. Otherwise, please, stop with the yapping about things you dont know about.

peace,
jd

 

[insolafide]

:dizzy:

YES or NO . . .

If God knows the actual outcome is the other possible outcome an actual possibility?

here theological fatalism rears its ugly head, once again. The other problem is a confusing of epistemic certainty and ontological necessity.

So, God's knowledge of the actual outcome is non-necessary. That is, the other possible outcome is a real actual could-be-chosen possibility. Its just that God happens to also know which of the two real actual could-be-chosen possibilities will in fact be chosen.

Follow this...
God knows what WILL be chosen, not what MUST be chosen.

or more technically...
God knows with epistemic certainty that which is metaphysically contingent.

or to use the equivocation-provoking Open Theism terminology...
God knows with epistemic certainty that which is metaphysically uncertain.

(please note in the last statement, the uses of certain are equivocal, which of course is intended in Open Theism...)

peace,
jd

 

[insolafide]

In my mind this is the equivalent of just coming right out and saying that God lies to us. This is simply not acceptable. How is this not a lie on God's part?

Thats why we should reject Open Theism. Because Open Theists say that God (unknowingly, perhaps) lies to us about the future.

Further, if you want to talk about taking the living out of life, if God knows what I will do I cannot do otherwise and am therefore not free and therefore not able to excercise volition of any kind including love. All choice is an illusion if God knows the future exhaustively. No that's what I call taking the living out of life!

ROFL. That is a flat-out endorsement of theological fatalism, which you cannot prove (at least, have not proven). God knows what will happen, not what must happen.

(1) Necessarily, If God foreknows X, X will happen.
(2) God foreknows X.
(3) X will happen.

The conclusion of 3 is that X will happen, not that it will happen with some kind of necessity. You want it to say this:

(3*) X will necessarily happen.

which is a modal fallacy. Good job. Unless you want to sit there and tell me that (2) should be:
(2*) Necessarily, God foreknows X.

You will never arrive at (3*). But, God's foreknowledge is not necessary since God was free to create ANY World, or even no world at all.

So, I'm sorry, but your thinking doesnt work.

peace,
jd

 

[GuySmiley]

Follow this...
God knows what WILL be chosen, not what MUST be chosen.

Think about this. If God knows what WILL be chosen, then no other outcome is possible. In your world, God might know what the other choice could be, but He still knows with certainty what WILL be chosen so . . .
no other outcome is possible.

This would be true of God's own choices also. God could be faced with a choice, but if his exhaustive foreknowledge says that He knows which choice He will make, then He can't possibly make the other choice.

Greg

 

[GuySmiley]

Thats why we should reject Open Theism. Because Open Theists say that God (unknowingly, perhaps) lies to us about the future.

How can someone unknowingly tell a lie?

 

[logos_x]

You people are talking past each other again.

Nail it down...God knows all that can be known at any given moment.
He is all knowing.
Moments that have not happened are malleable by both God's will and ours.
The future is determined by all wills in existance in relation to God's sovereign will, which is moving progressively toward drawing all wills in existence into concert with His own will.

The real issue is whether you believe God CAN and WILL do this having given Himself eternity to do it.

 

[insolafide]

Think about this. If God knows what WILL be chosen, then no other outcome is possible. In your world, God might know what the other choice could be, but He still knows with certainty what WILL be chosen so . . .
no other outcome is possible.

thats false, Guy. God's certain knowledge of what will be does not rule out that some other choice is not possible. The agent has it within his power to act such that God would have known differently.

I have presented a deductive argument as to why this is so, above. So, put your thinking cap on and refute the argument.

This would be true of God's own choices also. God could be faced with a choice, but if his exhaustive foreknowledge says that He knows which choice He will make, then He can't possibly make the other choice.

This may be the case - but this is a problem with being the same one who knows and acts. Molina had a solution to this which is rather complex involving something called supercomprehension - basically God has middle-knowledge only of those created essences which He transcends to such a degree as to supercomprehend their choices. God does not transcend Himself, and so gains knowledge of His own actions only as He, Himself decides them. But surely this is from eternity, so it can hardly be said that God even lacks knowledge of His own actions.

So, i would say this is a problem of the view called simple-foreknowledge. But that view has other problems as well, so I am not inclined to defend it.

peace,
jd

 

[godrulz]

Thats because you dont understand Molinism. You have demonstrated that already in another thread.

Since Molinism concludes that Exhaustive foreknowledge is compatible with libertarian freedom, and Has argumentation to prove so, then you need to demonstrate why this compatibility is an impossibility. Otherwise, Molinism wins, because it preserves Exhaustive foreknowledge (great making property) and Even Gives God augmented knowledge (knowledge of counterfactual realities) which is also a great-making property.

So lets see an argument why this compatibility fails. Otherwise, please, stop with the yapping about things you dont know about.

peace,
jd

The whole point of the debate between the major 4 views is that godly, capable scholars find evidence for their position and against others. It is patronizing to assume your position is the only defensible one with no problems whatsoever.

I do not understand how a 'would counterfactual' can be known before the fact if the choice is truly free/contingent. Simply assuming exhaustive foreknowledge and freedom must be compatible does not prove the point (begging the question). I understand might vs would and wonder why you would blur this distinction. "Would" still does not seem far off from determinism.

 

[Nathon Detroit]

thats false, Guy. God's certain knowledge of what will be does not rule out that some other choice is not possible. The agent has it within his power to act such that God would have known differently.

I have presented a deductive argument as to why this is so, above. So, put your thinking cap on and refute the argument.

Your argument refutes itself!

If perfect exhaustive foreknowledge is true God knows only actual outcomes and choices that are selected. All other choices by definition must not be actually possible since God's foreknowledge already knows they aren't the selected choices.

 

[insolafide]

How can someone unknowingly tell a lie?

by saying, "this is how it will be" when you are uncertain that "this is how it will be".

a non-lie version of the same statement would be... "this is how it could be" or "this is how it probably will be" where the probability is epistemic.

Of course, I think the correct way of looking at those statements is that the prophecies are counterfactual in nature. That is, God is giving counterfactual prophecies to the prophets which have implicit antecedents. with any conditional, if the antecedent is false, the statement may still be true.

"if I go to the store, i will buy new shoes"

could be true, even if i never go to the store.

peace,
jd

 

[godrulz]

here theological fatalism rears its ugly head, once again. The other problem is a confusing of epistemic certainty and ontological necessity.

So, God's knowledge of the actual outcome is non-necessary. That is, the other possible outcome is a real actual could-be-chosen possibility. Its just that God happens to also know which of the two real actual could-be-chosen possibilities will in fact be chosen.

Follow this...
God knows what WILL be chosen, not what MUST be chosen.

or more technically...
God knows with epistemic certainty that which is metaphysically contingent.

or to use the equivocation-provoking Open Theism terminology...
God knows with epistemic certainty that which is metaphysically uncertain.

(please note in the last statement, the uses of certain are equivocal, which of course is intended in Open Theism...)

peace,
jd

Can you illustrate this in a simple, self-evident way, such as when I refer to God not knowing the outcome of a Superbowl trillions of years before it is played (common sense)?

 

[godrulz]

Thats why we should reject Open Theism. Because Open Theists say that God (unknowingly, perhaps) lies to us about the future.



ROFL. That is a flat-out endorsement of theological fatalism, which you cannot prove (at least, have not proven). God knows what will happen, not what must happen.

(1) Necessarily, If God foreknows X, X will happen.
(2) God foreknows X.
(3) X will happen.

The conclusion of 3 is that X will happen, not that it will happen with some kind of necessity. You want it to say this:

(3*) X will necessarily happen.

which is a modal fallacy. Good job. Unless you want to sit there and tell me that (2) should be:
(2*) Necessarily, God foreknows X.

You will never arrive at (3*). But, God's foreknowledge is not necessary since God was free to create ANY World, or even no world at all.

So, I'm sorry, but your thinking doesnt work.

peace,
jd

Seems to smack of Deism or determinism...

Clete might want to tweak his statements about God being wrong. In "Divine Foreknowledge: 4 views" that he has referred to, Boyd does not suggest that God is wrong. Rather, He knows reality as it is distinguishing possible/probable/actual/necessary/contingent/conditional, etc.

 

[insolafide]

Your argument refutes itself!

If perfect exhaustive foreknowledge is true God knows only actual outcomes and choices that are selected. All other choices by definition must not be actually possible since God's foreknowledge already knows they aren't the selected choices.

No it doesnt refute itself. All other choices are still possible, its just they wont be chosen. for any decisions (X or ~X) there are two possibilities, but only one will be actual. It doesnt follow from X being chosen that ~X was therefore not a possible choice. The same works by looking at it as future.

It doesnt follow from the fact that ~X will be chosen, that X is therefore not a possible choice.

I cant put this distinction any more clearly.

peace,
jd

 

[godrulz]

This may be the case - but this is a problem with being the same one who knows and acts. Molina had a solution to this which is rather complex involving something called supercomprehension - basically God has middle-knowledge only of those created essences which He transcends to such a degree as to supercomprehend their choices. God does not transcend Himself, and so gains knowledge of His own actions only as He, Himself decides them. But surely this is from eternity, so it can hardly be said that God even lacks knowledge of His own actions.

peace,
jd

Supercomprehension sounds similar to perfect past and present knowledge. It still does not make contingent things certain/actual/knowable, nor does it negate possibilities/uncertainties/openness.

I do not think 'middle knowledge' is self-evident. Could it be a philosophical construct to attempt to retain exhaustive foreknowledge/free will?

Sorry for trying to understand and yapping without full comprehension. :baby:

 

[novice]

No it doesnt refute itself. All other choices are still possible, its just they wont be chosen. for any decisions (X or ~X) there are two possibilities, but only one will be actual. It doesnt follow from X being chosen that ~X was therefore not a possible choice. The same works by looking at it as future.

It doesnt follow from the fact that ~X will be chosen, that X is therefore not a possible choice.

I cant put this distinction any more clearly.

peace,
jd

Exhaustive foreknowldge is no different than exhastive past knowledge.

CASE IN POINT:
Three years ago I chose to eat chocolate ice cream instead of vanilla.

I have exhaustive knowledge that is the choice I made.

Is it possible (today) that I didn't actually choose chocolate three years ago but instead chose vanilla?