ARCHIVE: Open Theism part 3

[tetelestai]

How can He foreknow it if it is not settled?

Now, I know, and I know you know, that the answer is COMPATIBILISM.

Before you go flying off the handle about how the word "compatibilism" is not a real word, and not in your Microsoft Word spell check, it is a word that simply states:

Man has free will, and God knows the future.

Call it irrational, illogical, impossible, etc, but for those of us who are not open theists, or Calvinists, it's how we understand our free will, the future, and God.

You can deny it, and not believe it, but it is a word. See HERE

 

[tetelestai]

You underestimate God's ability to orchestrate and influence to bring things to pass. He is omnipotent, right?

You guys (open theists) go on, and on at the Calvinists, claiming they make God a puppet master, yet as soon as scripture is shown to you that shows God has EDF, you then turn God into a puppet master.

On one hand you preach libertarian free will & an open future, yet then claim God "brings things to past". Which one is it?

 

[voltaire]

yep tet. just exactly who are the true puppet masters?

 

[penofareadywriter]

You guys (open theists) go on, and on at the Calvinists, claiming they make God a puppet master, yet as soon as scripture is shown to you that shows God has EDF, you then turn God into a puppet master.

On one hand you preach libertarian free will & an open future, yet then claim God "brings things to past". Which one is it?

The difference is in Calvinism.... there is no freewill. In the open view, God orcastrates SOMETHINGS by WORKING WITH AND NOT BYPASSING our freewill.
God is able direct and orcastrate SOME(meaning this is not how God usualy works) events WITHOUT bypassing our freewill.

 

[SaulToPaul 2]

You guys (open theists) go on, and on at the Calvinists, claiming they make God a puppet master, yet as soon as scripture is shown to you that shows God has EDF, you then turn God into a puppet master.

Do I need to bring Daniel 11 out again? That usually kills this thread for a few weeks. :chuckle:

 

[tetelestai]

The difference is in Calvinism.... there is no freewill.

I'm not a Calvinist, but I think Calvinists believe in free will except when it comes to salvation. I think they believe everyone is born either an elect or a reprobate, and because of their belief in total depravity, they believe it is impossible to make the free volitional choice to believe or not believe in Jesus Christ. But other than that, they believe they have free volition to do anything else.

meaning this is not how God usualy works

How God "usually" works?

How do you come with this?

 

[tetelestai]

Do I need to bring Daniel 11 out again? That usually kills this thread for a few weeks. :chuckle:

Or the open theists will invent a phrase like:

"Soft Probable Inexhaustive Omni Casual Semi-Determined Ultra PreKnowledge".

There, that explains Daniel 11

Get your Godrulz dictionary ready

 

[penofareadywriter]

I'm not a Calvinist, but I think Calvinists believe in free will except when it comes to salvation. I think they believe everyone is born either an elect or a reprobate, and because of their belief in total depravity, they believe it is impossible to make the free volitional choice to believe or not believe in Jesus Christ. But other than that, they believe they have free volition to do anything else.




How God "usually" works?

How do you come with this?

What I mean is just because we have examples of God orcastrating certain events DOES NOT mean that He has orcastrated EVERY event in history.

 

[Ask Mr. Religion]

Call it irrational, illogical, impossible, etc, but for those of us who are not open theists, or Calvinists, it's how we understand our free will, the future, and God.

You can deny it, and not believe it, but it is a word. See HERE

Only a very small minority of those who label themselves "Calvinist" deny compatibilism. Please update your understanding of this doctrine accordingly.

AMR

 

[Ask Mr. Religion]

What I mean is just because we have examples of God orcastrating certain events DOES NOT mean that He has orcastrated EVERY event in history.

I don't know what "ors" God is "castrating", but I do know that He orchestrates all that occurs. That is, unless he is just a fickle kind of Being. If the latter, then why bother trusting anything He has to say? He may just change His mind.

If God is genuinely responsive to humans and to the course of history, and if God cannot infallibly know the future free decisions of man, it is in principle impossible for God to know infallibly what He will do in the future as well. In fact, God could not even know when to act as the actions of His so-called libertarian agents would constantly be changing the circumstances motivating His actions!

In other words, God's knowledge of His own actions in the future is at best probabilistic. If probabilistic, then the probability exists that He will be just plain wrong. If you claim no probability exists that He can get it wrong, then you are now in my back yard, appropriating my view of a sovereign God, where the concept of "probability" does not exist when it comes to His rule over His creation. So, please, make up your minds on the matter. Either God knows infallibility or He is just weighing the odds. And even if He is a supreme Oddsmaker, the label sticks and all that is associated with the term. This is not the God spoken of in Scripture.

Thus, God's statements that He will ultimately triumph over evil is no absolute guarantee. But we know that God is not a liar, so the assumptions of God's knowledge by open theists must be incorrect. The "problem" then, lies with open theism's assumptions of what God knows and God's sovereignty. Scripture is clear about God's exhaustive knowledge. For example, see Job 37:16; 1 John 3:20; 1 Cor. 2:10-11; Heb. 4:13; 2 Chron. 16:9; Job 28:24; Matthew 10:29-30; Isa. 46:9-10; Isa. 42:8-9; Matt. 6:8; Matt. 10:30; Ps. 139:1-2; Ps. 139:4; Ps. 139:16; Rom. 11:33

God is continually involved with all of His created things in such that God
(1) keeps them existing and maintaining the properties with which He created them;
(2) cooperates with created things in every action, directing their distinctive properties to cause them to act as they do; and
(3) directs them to fulfill His purposes.

In other words, God is totally sovereign over all of His creation. Absolutely nothing in God’s creation can act independently of God’s sovereignty. God will always do what He has said, and will fulfill what He has promised. Man may claim sovereignty over his own life, but ultimately God is in control. For example, see Heb 1:3; Col. 1:17; Acts 17:28; Neh. 9:6; 2 Peter 3:7; Job 12:23; Job 34:14-15; Job 38:32; Matt. 5:45; Matt. 6:26; Num. 23:19; 2 Sam. 7:28; Ps. 33:14-15; Ps. 104:14; Ps. 104:29; Ps. 135:6; Ps. 139:16; Ps. 141:6; Ps. 148:8; Prov. 16:1; Prov. 16:33; Prov. 20:24; Prov. 21:1; Prov. 30:5; John 17:17; Eph. 1:11; Gal. 1:15; Jer. 1:5; 1 Cor. 4:7

:squint:

AMR

 

[godrulz]

You guys (open theists) go on, and on at the Calvinists, claiming they make God a puppet master, yet as soon as scripture is shown to you that shows God has EDF, you then turn God into a puppet master.

On one hand you preach libertarian free will & an open future, yet then claim God "brings things to past". Which one is it?

God sending the Messiah in the first century and again at His future Second Coming is under His control without affecting free will. God can send predicted judgments without violating free will as to individual salvation.

 

[godrulz]

Do I need to bring Daniel 11 out again? That usually kills this thread for a few weeks. :chuckle:

You were given a response by Muz and myself, but you did not like it. There are answers. You have a bigger problem with many other biblical themes that support Open Theism than with a prophetic proof text that Open Theism has principles to explain.

 

[godrulz]

Or the open theists will invent a phrase like:

"Soft Probable Inexhaustive Omni Casual Semi-Determined Ultra PreKnowledge".

There, that explains Daniel 11

Get your Godrulz dictionary ready

You misunderstand the view and reject a straw man.

If you want mental gymnastics and confusion, try to explain Molinism or compatibilism. They are strained concepts to try to explain an indefensible assumption.

AMR: God can be in control without being all-controlling (determinism). You underestimate His ability and reduce things to a mechanistic view (at the expense of genuine, reciprocal, loving relationship).

 

[penofareadywriter]

Ask Mr Religion"If God is genuinely responsive to humans and to the course of history, and if God cannot infallibly know the future free decisions of man, it is in principle impossible for God to know infallibly what He will do in the future as well. In fact, God could not even know when to act as the actions of His so-called libertarian agents would constantly be changing the circumstances motivating His actions!"





Whats the problem with that? I have confidence in WHO GOD IS! And He is a God with INFINITE INTELLIGENCE! If the God you beleive does not have everything laid out for Him and controlling everything, then He is not God. The God I beleive in can be just as confident when facing possibilities as He is when he is facing certainty. WHY? Because God is INFINITELY SMART! So God can look(from eternity past) at a trillon possibilities and have a plan in place to bring good out of evil for every one of those possibilities.





Ask Mr Religion" In other words, God's knowledge of His own actions in the future is at best probabilistic. If probabilistic, then the probability exists that He will be just plain wrong"




So you must not trust... A. Gods Character(That He would always do the right thing!)
B.Gods INTELLIGENCE.(That He knows every one of His POSSIBLE actions.)


I would go on but I have to go.
The bottem line is you have a very low view of God. ( No offence)

 

[tetelestai]

Only a very small minority of those who label themselves "Calvinist" deny compatibilism. Please update your understanding of this doctrine accordingly.

AMR

There I go speaking for Calvinists again:doh:

I meant in regards to believing or not believing in Jesus.

I did say this:

I'm not a Calvinist, but I think Calvinists believe in free will except when it comes to salvation.

Is this the belief of the majority of Calvinists?

Since open theists have such a hard time with compatibilism, is there any good explanation of compatibilism that you have stored somewhere that you could post?

 

[godrulz]

There I go speaking for Calvinists again:doh:

I meant in regards to believing or not believing in Jesus.

I did say this:


Is this the belief of the majority of Calvinists?

Since open theists have such a hard time with compatibilism, is there any good explanation of compatibilism that you have stored somewhere that you could post?

You bet he does...here and here.

Compatibilism is complex and strained.

Libertarian free will theism is biblical and self-evident.

 

[Ask Mr. Religion]

Is this the belief of the majority of Calvinists?

No. Calvinists believe they have free will in all things, but by "free" we mean the ability to choose that which we most desire to choose. Libertarian free will claims the ability to choose otherwise, as if that act of choosing is divorced from any motivations/inclinations. Such a view is illogical in that such a person would never choose, existing in a frozen pose.

Since open theists have such a hard time with compatibilism, is there any good explanation of compatibilism that you have stored somewhere that you could post?

Take the above and now ask Who it is that orchestrates the circumstances within which we choose according to our greatest desires/motivations. That would be compatibilism (the very short version).

The longer version for those that want to go deeper...

Compatibilists like myself hold that genuine human freedom and causal determinism are indeed compatible. What is meant by “genuine human freedom,” however, is something quite different than the indeterminist’s libertarian freedom (the liberty of indifference, “to do otherwise”). For example, the open theist believes that he or she possesses the liberty of indifference, as if he or she can be autonomous from our Sovereign.

To a compatibilist, persons can exercise genuine freedom in their choices, that is to choose according to their greatest inclinations, but even when doing so there are still causal conditions (e.g., character, experiences, circumstances, etc.) which decisively incline the will to respond a certain way without indeed constraining it. The causal conditions are sufficiently strong to get the person to choose a certain option such that there are now some guarantees how the individual will freely respond, yet the person was acting according to their own wishes or desires, i.e. “without constraint.” This is also known as consequent necessity. Let me explain this last part with an example:

Necessity of a hypothetical inference...
If God foreknew Peter would sin, then Peter cannot refrain from sinning. (Incorrect)

The interpretation above wrongly interprets God's foreknowledge as impinging upon Peter's moral free agency. The proper understanding is:

The necessity of the consequent of the hypothetical...
Necessarily, if God foreknew Peter would sin, then Peter does not refrain from sinning. (Correct)

In other words, the actions of moral free agents do not take place because they are foreseen, the actions are foreseen because the actions are certain to take place.

Finally, it should be noted that compatibilists do not claim that all human actions are genuinely free in this sense. For example, if someone is forced at gun point to steal a car, that action is not free.

An illustration might help to explain the compatibilist view. Suppose I decide I want a given student in my class to leave the room. There are three ways I could accomplish this. I could literally grab the student and carry him out of the room. In this scenario, the constraint in operation on the student involves a force (me) exerted on the student that involves bodily movement, but not bodily movement that the student’s will in any sense made happen. Clearly he did not leave the room freely.

Or, I could threaten the student with a failing grade unless he left the room immediately. In this case, while the student does not really want to leave, yet on the other hand the student does not want a failing grade, so he decides to reluctantly leave the classroom. The constraint operating here is a force (me) that does not entirely remove willing by the student so constrained, although what is “chosen” by the student is contrary to what the student wished to choose. Again, the student did not leave the room freely.

Finally, I could perhaps point out the various factors that make it advantageous for the student to leave the room, though nothing I say threatens the student in any way. The student may not initially want to leave, for after all, I am a fantastic lecturer. Eventually though, I convince the student by reason and argument (without threats or warnings of danger if he refuses to go) to leave the classroom. In this situation, while the student did not initially want to leave, after considering all the pros and cons of staying or leaving, his desire to stay changed to a desire to leave, and the student acted on that new desire. In this scenario, a compatibilist will say that while the act (leaving the classroom) was causally determined, the student was not constrained to leave but did so voluntarily, in accord with his own nature, according to his own wishes.

To summarize, compatibilists hold that for every decision a person makes there are causal conditions playing upon that individual’s will so as to incline it decisively and sufficiently in one direction rather than another such that the agent could not have done otherwise, given the prevailing causal influences.

From the classroom illustration we see that human choices, though causally determined, are still free if they are done in accord with the human’s wishes. In decreeing and knowing all things, God certainly has decreed not only what we will do but also the factors that will lead us to act. In fact, even when causal conditions (e.g., character, experiences, circumstances, etc.) do not constrain our will, it is the conditions that constrain us, not God’s knowledge that does so.

As for sinful acts, while God decrees the circumstances in which we let ourselves become tempted and fall into sin, God neither tempts us nor empowers us to do evil, nor does God’s decree. Like everything we do, we do these acts in concert with our desires, and thus we do them freely (in the compatibilist sense of "free"), and what one does freely is something for which one is culpable.

The above is taken from a longer thread with more discussion here.

AMR

 

[godrulz]

If one likes yellow peppers and orange peppers equally, how does a compatibilist explain why one picks one or the other on any given day? There is nothing deterministic about this. The will/mind, not desires, is the seat of choice. Desires are influential, not causative. We can also choose contrary to our desires in a libertarian sense. I generally desire ice cream over liver, but I could pick liver if it was necessary to win a contest, even though I really desire ice cream. There is no reason to think our choices are caused or settled even before we exist.

The same irrationality exists with Molinism and middle knowledge that proposes counterfactuals of freedom to explain how God would know the future exhaustively. It assumes would/would not, but forgets about might/might not.

I believe compatibilism and Molinism have been refuted by astute theologians and philosophers. I also recognize that there are many good thinkers who feel strongly that they are defensible positions (Packer; William Lane Craig, etc.).

AMR will likely accuse me of asserting, even though that is basically what he does in this area. I have done my homework (but not an expert in these things), so I will not spend the next year researching this for everyone, spoon feeding, and writing theses instead of posts on TOL. I am not earning a degree here, but having some fun as a hobby.

 

[SaulToPaul 2]

You were given a response by Muz and myself, but you did not like it. There are answers. You have a bigger problem with many other biblical themes that support Open Theism than with a prophetic proof text that Open Theism has principles to explain.

Your answer was that God will cause all these things to happen.


Daniel 11
3: And a mighty king shall stand up, that shall rule with great dominion, and do according to his will.
4: And when he shall stand up, his kingdom shall be broken, and shall be divided toward the four winds of heaven; and not to his posterity, nor according to his dominion which he ruled: for his kingdom shall be plucked up, even for others beside those.
5: And the king of the south shall be strong, and one of his princes; and he shall be strong above him, and have dominion; his dominion shall be a great dominion.
6: And in the end of years they shall join themselves together; for the king's daughter of the south shall come to the king of the north to make an agreement: but she shall not retain the power of the arm; neither shall he stand, nor his arm: but she shall be given up, and they that brought her, and he that begat her, and he that strengthened her in these times.
7: But out of a branch of her roots shall one stand up in his estate, which shall come with an army, and shall enter into the fortress of the king of the north, and shall deal against them, and shall prevail:
8: And shall also carry captives into Egypt their gods, with their princes, and with their precious vessels of silver and of gold; and he shall continue more years than the king of the north.
9: So the king of the south shall come into his kingdom, and shall return into his own land.
10: But his sons shall be stirred up, and shall assemble a multitude of great forces: and one shall certainly come, and overflow, and pass through: then shall he return, and be stirred up, even to his fortress.
11: And the king of the south shall be moved with choler, and shall come forth and fight with him, even with the king of the north: and he shall set forth a great multitude; but the multitude shall be given into his hand.
12: And when he hath taken away the multitude, his heart shall be lifted up; and he shall cast down many ten thousands: but he shall not be strengthened by it.
13: For the king of the north shall return, and shall set forth a multitude greater than the former, and shall certainly come after certain years with a great army and with much riches.
14: And in those times there shall many stand up against the king of the south: also the robbers of thy people shall exalt themselves to establish the vision; but they shall fall.
15: So the king of the north shall come, and cast up a mount, and take the most fenced cities: and the arms of the south shall not withstand, neither his chosen people, neither shall there be any strength to withstand.
16: But he that cometh against him shall do according to his own will, and none shall stand before him: and he shall stand in the glorious land, which by his hand shall be consumed.
17: He shall also set his face to enter with the strength of his whole kingdom, and upright ones with him; thus shall he do: and he shall give him the daughter of women, corrupting her: but she shall not stand on his side, neither be for him.
18: After this shall he turn his face unto the isles, and shall take many: but a prince for his own behalf shall cause the reproach offered by him to cease; without his own reproach he shall cause it to turn upon him.
19: Then he shall turn his face toward the fort of his own land: but he shall stumble and fall, and not be found.
20: Then shall stand up in his estate a raiser of taxes in the glory of the kingdom: but within few days he shall be destroyed, neither in anger, nor in battle.
21: And in his estate shall stand up a vile person, to whom they shall not give the honour of the kingdom: but he shall come in peaceably, and obtain the kingdom by flatteries.
22: And with the arms of a flood shall they be overflown from before him, and shall be broken; yea, also the prince of the covenant.
23: And after the league made with him he shall work deceitfully: for he shall come up, and shall become strong with a small people.
24: He shall enter peaceably even upon the fattest places of the province; and he shall do that which his fathers have not done, nor his fathers' fathers; he shall scatter among them the prey, and spoil, and riches: yea, and he shall forecast his devices against the strong holds, even for a time.
25: And he shall stir up his power and his courage against the king of the south with a great army; and the king of the south shall be stirred up to battle with a very great and mighty army; but he shall not stand: for they shall forecast devices against him.
26: Yea, they that feed of the portion of his meat shall destroy him, and his army shall overflow: and many shall fall down slain.
27: And both these kings' hearts shall be to do mischief, and they shall speak lies at one table; but it shall not prosper: for yet the end shall be at the time appointed.


Is that your final answer? That God will cause these men to have these emotions, think these thoughts, and do these things?

 

[penofareadywriter]

No. Calvinists believe they have free will in all things, but by "free" we mean the ability to choose that which we most desire to choose. Libertarian free will claims the ability to choose otherwise, as if that act of choosing is divorced from any motivations/inclinations. Such a view is illogical in that such a person would never choose, existing in a frozen pose.


Take the above and now ask Who it is that orchestrates the circumstances within which we choose according to our greatest desires/motivations. That would be compatibilism (the very short version).

The longer version for those that want to go deeper...

Compatibilists like myself hold that genuine human freedom and causal determinism are indeed compatible. What is meant by “genuine human freedom,” however, is something quite different than the indeterminist’s libertarian freedom (the liberty of indifference, “to do otherwise”). For example, the open theist believes that he or she possesses the liberty of indifference, as if he or she can be autonomous from our Sovereign.

To a compatibilist, persons can exercise genuine freedom in their choices, that is to choose according to their greatest inclinations, but even when doing so there are still causal conditions (e.g., character, experiences, circumstances, etc.) which decisively incline the will to respond a certain way without indeed constraining it. The causal conditions are sufficiently strong to get the person to choose a certain option such that there are now some guarantees how the individual will freely respond, yet the person was acting according to their own wishes or desires, i.e. “without constraint.” This is also known as consequent necessity. Let me explain this last part with an example:

Necessity of a hypothetical inference...
If God foreknew Peter would sin, then Peter cannot refrain from sinning. (Incorrect)

The interpretation above wrongly interprets God's foreknowledge as impinging upon Peter's moral free agency. The proper understanding is:

The necessity of the consequent of the hypothetical...
Necessarily, if God foreknew Peter would sin, then Peter does not refrain from sinning. (Correct)

In other words, the actions of moral free agents do not take place because they are foreseen, the actions are foreseen because the actions are certain to take place.

Finally, it should be noted that compatibilists do not claim that all human actions are genuinely free in this sense. For example, if someone is forced at gun point to steal a car, that action is not free.

An illustration might help to explain the compatibilist view. Suppose I decide I want a given student in my class to leave the room. There are three ways I could accomplish this. I could literally grab the student and carry him out of the room. In this scenario, the constraint in operation on the student involves a force (me) exerted on the student that involves bodily movement, but not bodily movement that the student’s will in any sense made happen. Clearly he did not leave the room freely.

Or, I could threaten the student with a failing grade unless he left the room immediately. In this case, while the student does not really want to leave, yet on the other hand the student does not want a failing grade, so he decides to reluctantly leave the classroom. The constraint operating here is a force (me) that does not entirely remove willing by the student so constrained, although what is “chosen” by the student is contrary to what the student wished to choose. Again, the student did not leave the room freely.

Finally, I could perhaps point out the various factors that make it advantageous for the student to leave the room, though nothing I say threatens the student in any way. The student may not initially want to leave, for after all, I am a fantastic lecturer. Eventually though, I convince the student by reason and argument (without threats or warnings of danger if he refuses to go) to leave the classroom. In this situation, while the student did not initially want to leave, after considering all the pros and cons of staying or leaving, his desire to stay changed to a desire to leave, and the student acted on that new desire. In this scenario, a compatibilist will say that while the act (leaving the classroom) was causally determined, the student was not constrained to leave but did so voluntarily, in accord with his own nature, according to his own wishes.

To summarize, compatibilists hold that for every decision a person makes there are causal conditions playing upon that individual’s will so as to incline it decisively and sufficiently in one direction rather than another such that the agent could not have done otherwise, given the prevailing causal influences.

From the classroom illustration we see that human choices, though causally determined, are still free if they are done in accord with the human’s wishes. In decreeing and knowing all things, God certainly has decreed not only what we will do but also the factors that will lead us to act. In fact, even when causal conditions (e.g., character, experiences, circumstances, etc.) do not constrain our will, it is the conditions that constrain us, not God’s knowledge that does so.

As for sinful acts, while God decrees the circumstances in which we let ourselves become tempted and fall into sin, God neither tempts us nor empowers us to do evil, nor does God’s decree. Like everything we do, we do these acts in concert with our desires, and thus we do them freely (in the compatibilist sense of "free"), and what one does freely is something for which one is culpable.

The above is taken from a longer thread with more discussion here.

AMR

Thoughts on my post #1954?