1. Premises in which the truth of the conclusion is claimed or the truth of the conclusion is assumed (either directly or indirectly).
2. Claim C (the conclusion) is true.
1. "If stoning is permissible" (assumes punishment is still permissible)
2. "beating is permissible."
"If stoning is permissible, then beating is permissible" doesn't imply that the antecedent holds true. It simply indicates that the antecedent or the protasis (the "if" part of the conditional) cannot be true and the consequent or the apodosis (the "then" part of the conditional) be false.
Thus, we can look at the statement from the opposite direction:
"If beating is not permissible, then stoning is not permissible."
Ultimately, the above statement doesn't really say anything more than what I've listed as premise 4 above:
"If the more severe may be prescribed in punishment, the less severe may in principle be permitted."
You, of course, have two options if you don't want to concede the point:
1. You can deny the principle that if the more severe is permissible, then the less severe is permissible. (This would to be to deny the hypothetical proposition.)
2. You can deny that stoning is permissible. [This would be to deny the truth of the antecedent; note, of course, that this would not be sufficient to show that beating is not permissible (beating could be permissible, but stoning not be permissible); it simply would render me unable to draw the inference.]
Punishment is not permissible for adultery or whatever you think deserves a wife-beating.
1. The Law of Moses disagrees.
2. Punishment of any kind? Even preferential treatment in a divorce case in favor of the offended spouse?
Mosaic laws have been abrogated. See Colossians 2:14. Casts doubt on your first premise.
Two points:
1. Even granting that they have been abrogated, this doesn't refute the proposition, i.e., which is that stoning is, in principle, permissible. Even if you deny that societies other than the ancient Jewish body politic should stone adulterers, you must nonetheless grant that it was permissible for them.
If you grant this (as you must), I'll then ask: "Granted that stoning was permissible, could Moses have prescribed beating instead, for at least some cases?"
If you say "yes," then you've granted my point. The question at that point ceases to be whether beating a woman is permissible or not at least in principle (since you will have granted the point); the question becomes a matter of
when and under what circumstances it is permissible (the answer to this question, of course, very well may "very rarely; perhaps almost never; most men will never see a circumstance in which it is just for them to beat their respective wives").
2. Protestants like to throw out this assertion, but I'm not particularly impressed by it.
A. It makes much more sense simply to point out that the Mosaic Law was a legal code for a particular body politic, i.e., ancient Israel/Judea. I am as much bound to the particulars of the Mosaic Law as I would be bound to the particulars of German law, whether or not the Law of Moses has been abrogated.
B. What you actually seem to be meaning is that the Mosaic Law should in no way to be imitated by other nation-states. Against this, however, is the following:
St. Paul nowhere says this. It is certainly true that certain precepts of the Mosaic Law were fitting in principle only for Israel and Judea and it would be a moral evil for them to be adopted today: I have in mind, of course, the ceremonial precepts. Now that Jesus, who is our high priest, paschal sacrifice, our mercy seat and our bread of the presence, has fulfilled the ceremonial precepts of the law, which were only a dim foreshadowing of the Christ who was to come, it would be a most outrageous offense against God to return to them.
To be so quick, however, to dismiss the juridical precepts of the Law (i.e., the criminal and civic penalties and practices) is to cast serious doubt on whether those laws were good and just laws. I say that they were excellent laws and most fitting to ensure the common good of the ancient Jewish political society.
There's no reason why other political societies should not, depending on their circumstances, adopt similar laws. If eating pork occasions a public health hazard, then the State should ban pork. [If I'm not mistaken, the eating of pork was seriously frowned upon, if not illegal, for at least some period of time in ancient Rome; in the
Brothers Menaechmi, when the social parasite is talking about the pork feast that he wants at the house of the prostitute, Plautus is doing this to make fun of the Greeks; no good Roman of his time would eat such a meal.]
Again, if you object to the death penalty for adulterers, then I'll tell you that this was permitted even among the Greeks. Punishment for adultery was not unique to the law of Moses, nor did it magically and suddenly disappear with the advent of Christianity.
The legal practices of the Jews were good, holy and just. They were a particular determination of eternal and unchanging principles of justice to their time and to their society. For other societies, these determinations may be different. But we shouldn't be so quick to throw out the juridical wisdom of the Law.
you have no legal support for that premise, so I don't accept it.
Yes, I do. Consider the fact that murder may be punished either with prison or death. Consider that a judge has both a minimum and maximum penalty at his disposal when it comes to sentencing a convict. Consider the fact that in some places, marijuana is legal, whereas in other places, it will get you a ticket and fine, whereas if the Feds catch you...
What I've said is either obviously true or obviously false. If you insist that, for any given crime, there is one and precisely one acceptable punishment, then what I've said is clearly false. The less severe punishment is too lenient and, therefore, unjust. All murderers MUST die. Period. No exceptions. Again: all adulterers MUST die. Period. No exceptions.
If you say this, however, then you actually end up arguing against your previous assertions. In that case, the legal penalties imposed by the Law of Moses are the only just ones, and all societies should adopt them.
If you don't assert that, then it seems to me as though you simply must accept my premise.
Do you have a Mosaic law that allows a husband to beat his wife for any reason?
Right off hand? I don't recall one. Nonetheless, do you deny that Moses could have permitted it in the case of adultery?
I accept that premise, but also remind you that the State has made wife beating illegal, so immoral even for legalistic folk.
I grant that. If the State doesn't delegate its right of violence to the offended party, then the offended party is not permitted to exact vengeance.
