The following paper by a
well-known church historian has been quoted as being one item no open theist has adequately responded to:
http://tinyurl.com/9cofpnd
I am genuinely interested in your cogent responses.
thanks,
[url=http://www.davidcox.com.mx/library/H/Hodge,%20A%20A%20-%20Outlines%20of%20Systematic%20Theology.pdf]AMR[/URL]
My response to Muller's paper is somewhat limited by not having read Pinnock's piece which the paper is in response to. With that said, I will make a few comments.
I agree with Muller that the Christian concept of immutability is divergent from Greek philosophical concept. The Christian concept indeed is not static in the way that the Greek concept is, but it is not as active as it seems on face value or as Muller suggests. I will expound on what I mean later. Muller focuses on the immutability of God's ethics, attributes, and nature. None of which is challenged by the majority of open theists, and I can hardly believe Pinnock did so in his piece (being familiar with his work), although I cannot be certain.
Muller objects to Pinnock's assertion that classical theists are arbitrary in their assignments of figurative language. He uses Mal. 3: 6-7 to make his point that recognition of figurative language is not based on a philosophical commitment, but logical necessity based on Scripture. Muller states that concept of God “returning” to his people cannot be taken to mean God has physically moved away from his people and with return, but to return is a reference to God’s immutable ethic and promise to be with his people when they are in the correct relationship with him. I have no idea why Muller uses this verse as an example as I don’t think that anyone would argue about the context of this verse. It would have been much more beneficial to engage Exodus 32:14 or Genesis 6:6. Nonetheless, he states that since his exegesis of the above verse shows the change is in the creature and that God’s immutable ethic is necessary the same sort of necessary immutability can be said of the entirety of God’s being. This is all well and good, but it misses the point.
The open theist position is not that the “divine being” changes in any sense. God’s nature, attributes, and morality are all constant. There is no fear in uncertainty of God because his promises and purposes remain constant. In this sense, Muller does not seem to have a good grasp on the objection against classical immutability. However, Muller does extend his critique to include divine knowledge, which is where the difference comes to a head.
Muller says that the implication of repentance verses is that there is an immutability of divine knowledge. He presents this as a natural conclusion and does not elaborate. However, Mal. 3: 6-7 does not seem to imply such divine foreknowledge and Exodus 32:14 and Genesis 6:6 seem to offer a direct challenge to the notion. He continues by saying that if we do not hold to God’s immutable knowledge then we are left with a God who “really did not know where Adam was”, who “really had to go down to Sodom to find out for himself what went on there”, and “invented the incarnation as a hasty response to a fall that he did not forsee”.
The trouble with these statements is that they need not follow from an open view of divine foreknowledge. The open view proposes that God has complete past and present knowledge. As such, God would very well have known where Adam was and what was going on in Sodom. Many versions of the open view also propose that God knows all possible future events. If this is the case, God would have known from the beginning that the fall was possible, even probable, and the incarnation need to be characterized as a “hasty response”. Secondly, there is no reason that the incarnation be inseparable from atonement. There is no reason why God may not have always planned on the incarnation regardless of the state of humanity. The incarnation, as “the center of and meaning of all history”, could very well still have been planned from the foundation of the world and be consistent with an open view.
The real underlying issue is the necessary link of timelessness and the absolute immutability of God. Muller does not address the issue head on, but it is clearly a presupposition. This is most notable in his appeal to Victorinus who proposed that God was eternally active, yet careful to state that while all change is activity, not all activity is change. Muller does not elaborate on this distinction, but stresses that God’s activity is an immutable activity. It is this eternal, immutable activity that those with an open view object to. Such a conception of divine activity seems to not really be activity but static being. If God’s activity is eternal, his activity then must be coeternal with God. If God’s activity is coeternal then it is not an act of volition, but wrapped up in God’s being. There is no intention in this sort of activity since there was no opportunity for God to have thought to create and implement that desire. God is trapped by his own eternal action rather than free and sovereign. Additionally, the distinction between Creator and creature is at least blurred and likely nonexistent. To construe the incarnation is this light implies that Jesus’ eternal purpose is to reconcile humanity’s sin. If this is true, Jesus’ nature is dependent on human sin. The second person of the Trinity could not have an identity unrelated to human sin. By the same token, sin must exist for Jesus to exist. A troublesome thought to say the least.
Lastly, Muller insists that the incarnation does not imply any change in God at all. He repeatedly states that God does not change since the incarnation is a manifestation of God’s immutable purpose. I gladly admit that God has always had the purpose to guide humanity into maturity and draw humanity into the divine life. However, I cannot agree with Muller that reconciliation is an immutable purpose. To do so is to admit that sin is inherent to God’s existence.
