I again apologize for the long delays between my posts. It's quite obvious that I have a lot to say on this topic, and Squishes has provided lots of targets for me to aim at. To those who continue to follow this discussion, thank you. I hope it is of some use to you, and that the delays have been worth the wait.
The N-Word
To presume
neutrality in any aspect of one's thinking is to tacitly allow the notion of objective standards that stand outside or above that which one is being "neutral" about. Here are two incongruous quotes from Squishes' previous post:
Squishes said:
… for the most part, I use words in a very neutral way. …{emphasis added}
Squishes said:
I don't think there are objective, ideal standards of success or of a good argument. {emphasis added}
The very attempt to be "neutral" presupposes a completely objective, ideal standard. Whether we are talking about being "neutral" about one's choice of words or of being "neutral" about one's rejection of "standards of success of a good argument," there can be no "neutrality." This is because all things without exception -- from the manners in which observational data are gathered and organized, to how evidence is framed and assessed -- are subject to each man's unique background, emotional makeup, prior experiences, etc. No man can untether his thinking from interpretative standards, as if he could approach "brute facts" and "raw data" with a blank mind. From the very start of an inquiry, the way one goes about looking for evidence betrays a bias in favor of the answer one expects to get. Moreover, even the framing of the argument or question relies on the inquirer already having a particular answer in mind in order guide his investigation.
Brain Fizz: There Is No Mind
Given all this subjectivity, by what standard should we assess the merits of competing hypotheses? Should we simply appeal to the cards we've been dealt, blindly asserting the legitimacy of our mental processes and assuming the verity of our sensory faculties without warrant? If our faculties of logic are merely descriptions of brain states and physiological electrochemical processes in that 3-pound meat computer between our ears, as Squishes asserts, then there can be nothing "illogical" or violations of logic. This is because the behaviorist-atomist-pragmatist-deflationist-materialist-naturalist reduces logic to synaptic fizzing and popping in the brain, and fizzing and popping in your brain is not necessarily the same as the fizzing and popping in mine. Thus, there can be no violation of logic, because such a critique isn't about logic, but rather instances of fizzing and popping. Your cerebral popping and encephalo-fizzing might make you believe that it is logical to dress lightly on a hot, humid day. Whereas the fizzes and pops in my brain make me want to wear a winter coat despite the 90 degrees and 95% humidity. Your brain crackles and says I am violating logic. My brain crackles and says I am being quite reasonable. On this view, there is no illogic, only a difference in physiology and instances of different synaptic events.
Squishes wants to say his disbelief (i.e. brain fizz) in God is reasonable, yet he admits that sitting in chairs is non-rational (though not "irrational," mind you),
as if logic were actually more than mere synaptic signalling in the brain, which he flatly denies. He says there are no successful arguments for the existence of God, yet he baldly asserts that he doesn't "think [i.e., more brain fizz] there are objective, ideal standards of success or of a good argument." It is clear that, despite Squishes skepticism about "standards" and "laws" and "knowledge," he behaves and operates as if they exist, and regiments his beliefs (i.e., brain fizz) accordingly.
Squishian Solipsism
What this all means then is that our debate is not really about the evidentiary merit of either hypothesis (since Squishes disallows standards of a good argument and knowledge), nor is it about logical soundness (given Squishes' skepticism about logical laws). Rather, it is about Squishes himself. The original wording of the quasi-proposition was "whether there are any successful arguments for God's existence, and ... whether it is reasonable to disbelieve in God," but it's clear from Squishes' posts that it should have been worded "whether there are any arguments for God's existence that will subjectively persuade Squishes to believe in God, and whether it is reasonable, despite the absence of such a 'really real' thing as 'reason,' for Squishes to disbelieve in God."
Thus, it is important, paramount even, to recognize oft-repeated phrases (i.e., expressions of brain fizzing) in Squishes' posts: "I don't … I don't think so … I don't accept ..." And this should come as no surprise, since, as it turns out, this is not about the soundness of arguments by any legitimate standard, but about Squishes' particular persuasion. In fact, Squishes, by framing the debate in this way, exempts himself from justifying or legitimizing any single thing that he "doesn't think" or "doesn't accept," since his "thoughts" and "acceptance" are merely expressions of his brain fizz. He has, in effect, made his job much easier -- he even admits to a certain passivity in the discussion -- and has made mine infinitely harder (please excuse the hyperbole). That is to say, my task is not to persuade Squishes to change his thoughts and accept my arguments. Rather, I must alter the physiological processes of Squishes' brain, i.e., noodle around with his brain fizz chemistry. Thus, this isn't really a debate, but is instead an instance of two brains fizzing, that is, one organism with a particular kind of brain attempting to effect a change in another organism with a different kind of brain. And nothing could be more absurd.
As I stated at the onset,
It should be duly noted that an argument does not need to be agreed to or accepted by everyone, or even the majority, for it to be nonetheless conclusive. There is a difference between personal persuasion, cogency and "compelling," which are subjective, and conclusive proof, which is objective. For example, despite whatever reasoning or facts are presented to him, a man can be unpersuaded that the engine of his car is on the verge of complete failure due to a lack of oil. He may even refuse to add oil to its crankcase. But the conclusive and objective nature of the case is that the motor will indeed seize up in a matter of time.
Thus far, it appears that Squishes is not interested in the reasoning or facts that are presented to him, but rather in how he feels, what he thinks (sans objective reason, sans standards of a good argument), and somehow knowing "it" when he see it -- all via some imagined neutrality, and all merely comprising electrochemical fizzing, popping and zapping in his cranial glands.
The C-Word
With each unfolding layer of Squishes' worldview and approach to knowing, massive
contradictions emerge and belie the very notion of debate and discursive reasoning. Above, I demonstrated that Squishes' attempt to be "neutral" is contradictory to his denial of "objective, ideal standards." But the contradictions in Squishes' worldview don't end there.
Hilston said:
I would request an example of a proof for something you did not previously believe that you "knew when you saw it."
Squishes said:
This is difficult to do because it requires an attempt to dredge up an introspective moment from the past. But I think I could give you examples from science. As an undergrad in college I first heard of "Quantum Entanglement", whereby two particles become entangles such that you can change the spin of one and the other is affected instantaneously. I did a little research, looked over a few papers, talked to our chemistry professor and became convince it was a real phenomena.
In Squishes' opening post, he stated that there is no faculty of reason, only "evolutionarily-formed modules" in the brain. From this pronouncement, he derives and declares his skepticism about causation, laws and knowledge. Yet, in the description of his investigations above, he clearly employs each of these. He asserts that he now believes, based on his investigations, that the entanglement of two particles can
cause an instantaneous change in their spin. Note that he contradicts his earlier claim that he contributes very little to his belief, that they are "things that happen to us, not something we pick out like the day's outfit." Moreoever, he does not claim that such an instance is a one-off, but that he now believes "quantum entanglement" to be a real phenomenon, implying a regularity which necessitates an existing
law that governs that regularity. While he appears to be careful
not to say that he
knows it is a real phenomenon, and apparently has an aversion to saying that quantum entanglement is "true," his behavior in seeking out the evidence shows that he presumes to
know something about the process by which he investigated the concept and found it to be so (i.e. "true").
Squishes said:
I place a great deal of importance on the priors that determine how one takes the evidence.
But, according to Squishes, "
a priori considerations will not get you very far." Yet another contradiction of Squishism, placing "great importance" on something that will not get you very far.
Furthermore, despite the "great importance" Squishes places on priors, he admits of blindly accepting his priors, because the "universe made him that way." But then he admits of the possibility that the universe is random and not lawful, yet behaves in this debate as if the universe is lawful and not random (i.e., using the rules of language and applying logic, despite his disbelief in such things). He admits of the possibility that the universe is lawful and not random, yet he denigrates the very tools by which its lawfulness is described, understood and made useful.
Hilston said:
Then is it correct to say that you do not view the generalization, "There are no good arguments for God's existence," as "far-reaching"?
Squishes said:
I don't think it is. I am open to there being good arguments for the existence of God, …
Another contradiction. Earlier, Squishes said "I don't think there are objective, ideal standards of success or of a good argument," yet he claims he will know one when he sees one. By what standard? How does he legitimize that standard? According to acetylcholine secretions in his brain?
Squishes said:
... and I even concede that some arguments can be initially difficult to undercut. The Cosmological Argument taps into a near universal intuition that events need explanations. So I don't think I'm generalizing unfairly.
Another contradiction. Squishes "concedes" that there are arguments that can be difficult to undercut. He "concedes" that the Cosmo' Argument has a near universal appeal. And then he says,
"So," as in,
"thus." But the statement that follows is out of step with the preceding concessions. It's like saying, "I concede that ice cream is difficult to resist, and I concede that it is nearly universally enjoyed. So I don't think my claim that ice cream is yucky is far-reaching."
Squishes said:
We think the best way to find out what is in the world is to study the world, not fool around with sentences.
Yet, Squishes comes here, and by the use of (gasp) sentences, he endeavors to convey meaning and relevance about … what? His study of the world? So, contrary to his claim, he does indeed fool around with sentences. In fact, he must do so in order to convey meaning and relevance about his study of the world. The contradictions in Squishes' worldview are vast and pervasive. It's like saying, "We think the best way to find out about food is to eat it, not fool around with recipes." Moreover, in his study of the world, he must assume and employ such "not really-real" "that-which-is-not-a-thing" non-things as induction, sensory observation and the scientific method, all without warrant, verification or justification; none of which make sense in a godless conception of the universe, and only make sense if the God of the Bible exists.
The Unwinnable Debate
Squishes said:
I have a naturalistic view of success, where an argument is successful just if the strength of a belief is higher after hearing the evidence than before hearing the evidence.
How does it make any sense to claim a "naturalistic" view of something that, according to Squishism, isn't natural. His sophism renders the concept of "successful" entirely meaningless.
Squishes said:
When there are two competing hypotheses, an argument is successful if a set of evidence raises your strength of belief to a higher degree than the competitor.
Setting aside the rampant question-begging for a moment, notice how Squishes' statement here concedes the debate as stated. In other words, the quasi-proposition of this discussion, "whether there are any successful arguments for God and whether it is reasonable to disbelieve in God," is proven by the fact that there exist arguments (even bad arguments) that have successfully resulted in raising the strength of belief for scads of previously non-believing people, myself included. The only way his statement is not a concession is if his statement is really and exclusively about
Squishes himself, not about what is logically sound or conclusive. Also, in response to my having affirmed that sitting in chairs is rational only if God exists, he says:
Squishes said:
This belief [of sitting in chairs] is not irrational, but it is non-rational.
How is this also not conceding the debate, i.e., that it is
not reasonable (i.e., non-rational) to disbelieve in God? The only way Squishes' statement is not a concession is if his statement is solely about
Squishes himself, and
his conception of what constitutes rationality. According to the Squishistic neologisms set forth in this dialogue, this is an unwinnable debate.
I'm still trying to get my head around the notion that logic and arguments are not "things," because for all the discourse we're having, despite Squishes' revisions of language, we're certainly behaving as if there is really some
thing to these supposed "non-things."
Squishes said:
I don't think there are objective, ideal standards of success or of a good argument.
Then what are we doing? I've agreed to a debate, which by definition, involves the presentation of arguments and critical assessments thereof. What I didn't know going in was that my opponent isn't really an opponent, but rather a self-vitiating solipsism whose inane pronouncements have no connection to his own behavior, and whose denials are without justification, validation or meaning. Debate is not possible with a Squishist because, not only are the goal posts moved continuously, there is no rulebook and there is no referee.
Amputees, Sensory Calibration and Question Begging
Squishes said:
Thus, if you never encounter a miracle in your life, you are unlikely to be moved by a report of a miracle since your prior belief in the laws of nature (observed regularities) make miracle-claims difficult to substantiate.
This does not follow. By definition, there must be prior observed regularities in order for a miracle to stand out and to be recognized as a non-regular event. This would make a miracle claim especially easy to substantiate.
If, contrary to all prior observed cases of amputee patients, one patient regenerates a previously amputated limb, the recognition of that non-regular event is likely to move the entire medical community, and it would most certainly be easy to substantiate.
Hilston said:
Why do you prefer Correspondence Theory over Coherence Theory?
Squishes said:
I don't. I am a deflationist about truth, and thus find neither theory appealing.
Please accept my apology. Somehow I got it into my head that you espoused Correspondence.
Based on a cursory perusal of Deflationism, I'm further convinced that this debate in an exercise in futility where Squishes is concerned. My only aim now is to demonstrate to the readers the absolute absurdity of Squishism, and the exclusive rationality of Biblical Theism.
Squishes said:
I can't tell you why I trust my senses, only that I do and this belief is not up to me. Even if I wanted to import the strongest sort of skepticism into my daily life I could not. I take it as a presupposition, and I find myself unable to deny it.
I understand, and the fact that Squishes cannot deny his trust in his senses should affirm to him of God's existence and attributes. But it should be stated that this appeal to
a priori and intransigent/inexorable belief in one's senses neither justifies, nor calibrates them to reality. I know this all too well because I am color blind. I've learned not to trust my perception of color.
Applying the reasoning (i.e. brain fizz) of the Squishian Sensory Imperative in another way, someone might just as readily claim that he can't say
why he believes the horoscope, only
that he does and that belief is not up to him. Even if he wanted to deny the horoscopes relevance, he could not, and finds himself unable to deny it. How is Squishes' appeal any different? What validates Squishes' appeal to the
a priori nature and the intransigence/inexorability of his belief in his senses?
Squishes said:
Now, I take it that it is further confirmed through experience; regularities occur, I can predict what I will sense in the future in some given time and location, etc, and so this belief is only strengthened with experience. But I cannot tell you why it is initially more plausible than not.
It must be noted that Squishes' is here begging the very question. His confirmations through experience, his perceptions of supposed regularities, his predictions and their observed fulfillments, all depend upon the
a priori assumption that his sense perceptions comport with reality. No one can calibrate one's sensory faculties using one's sensory faculties, as color-blind people know well, no more than we can use induction to verify induction, or apply the scientific method to validate the scientific method.
Squishes said:
Reasons to believe in the resurrection are probabilistic and usually non-deductive. Soundness becomes uninteresting in these cases (or at least trivial).
Biblically, the only sound reason to believe in the resurrection, despite whatever Josh McDowell or the various evidentialist Resurrection Apologists will assert, is the unequivocal teaching of God via the Bible. In a rational world, the only
a priori consideration that matters is the existence and nature of God. What are the Squishistic criteria for "soundness"?
Truth, Justification, and the Agnostic Way
Squishes said:
I don't know of any arguments that do not depend on background beliefs, but I suspect necessary truths would be the ones that get close.
I could make a guess about what you view as "necessary truths," but it would be better to ask you directly: What are the "necessary truths"?
Hilston said:
Why does the piecing together of the brain by natural forces preclude a faculty of reason? Why does that not preclude the faculties of sight and smell as well?
Squishes said:
Sensory neurons distribute information to specialized parts of the brain. "Reason" is too abstract to be physically realized, but the instances of "reasoning" are just the different modules doing their business. Determining how to get back home is a complicated process algebra on geometry, but these are quite literal processes where the neurons themselves do the work (not some faculty or part of the brain). A neuron represents your starting location, and a circadian clock along with some sensory details of velocity updates your current location in relation to you starting location. There is no CPU the information gets sent to, even if it feels sometimes that we are doing the mental lifting.
This doesn't answer the question. Why does the piecing together of the brain by natural forces preclude a faculty of reason? Why does that not preclude the faculties of sight and smell as well?
Hilston said:
How do the terms "false justification," "ambiguous belief," and "compounded error" make sense in an agnostic skeptic's worldview? And again, this appears arbitrary. Instead of rejecting, why not adopt a belief in case a failure to do so would lead to false justification, ambiguous belief and compounded error down the line?
Squishes said:
We don't adopt those beliefs because they are harmful.
According to whom? What is a "false justification"?
Squishes said:
People who lived that way did not get to make babies with the same level of success as those who were more careful. There is nothing more rational about it. As Quine put it, "Creatures inadvertently wrong in their inductions have a pathetic but praiseworthy tendency to die before reproducing their kind."
Squishes arbitrarily defines "success" as being able to make babies. He presumes to declare what is harmful and that harm is to be avoided, all without warrant. He says this is rational, yet he cannot produce, let alone justify the criteria for his pronouncement.
hilston said:
A noun refers to a person, place or thing. By elimination, induction is a thing.
Squishes said:
I don't accept this method.
And I don't accept Squishes' linguistic sophistry. So, now what?
Squishes said:
As noted before, I think that this move from language to ontology is inconclusive at best. Induction describes (it is a description, not a thing) a family of concepts all centered around absorbing experience into our decision making. There's a good reason we never bump into induction in the world, and it's precisely because it isn't a thing.
As noted above, Squishes and his ilk do not want to acknowledge the "Thing-ness" of things that do not have corporeal existence, despite their necessity in our everyday lives, because such an acknowledgement ineluctably confronts them with the necessary existence of God Who is back of rationality, and hence, is back of all predication, all abstract, universal and invariant entities that all men rely upon in their daily existence and experience.
The Squishistic standard for "Thing-ness" is whether some"thing" can be bumped into. I will henceforth call this the "Stubbed Toe Criterion" for Squishian Thing-ness. But despite the sophism, the "that which isn't a thing" called induction describes an actual process of paramount relevance and utility in our daily lives; a "non-thing," not "really real" some"thing" "that which isn't a thing" that keeps us from touching fire, help us to stay out of jail, enables us to ride bicycles, to map genomes, to sit in chairs, to fly around the world, to avoid drowning, to raise our children and to find fulfillment and meaning in our lives. But no, it's not a thing because we can't stub our big toe on it.
The Essence of Substance and Non-descriptive Descriptors
Squishes said:
I will just take a realist view of substances for the time being. Take a "thing" to be a substance.
Why should we? Why can't we take a "thing" to be its essence? Why not both, reciprocally?
Squishes said:
People are substances. Presumably, governments are not substances.
Yet, if Squishes gave up on induction, broke a "non-substantial" law prescribed by the presumed "non-substantial" government, Squishes could very well have his "substantial" hind-quarters hauled into a "substantial" prison. For all of Squishes' appeal to the pragmatic, the deconstructionist approach to language and meaning is anything but, and belies a fundamental component of everyday human experience.
Squishes said:
So, we can talk all we want of different truths. We may even agree on many of them.
For example?
Squishes said:
But I will not accept the move from truth to metaphysical structure. The laws of logic may be necessarily true, but that in and of itself tells me nothing of the world of substances and things.
Another contradiction. Elsewhere, Squishes has stated that induction is a description. Unless Squishes wants to invoke yet another neologism to the Squishian Lexicon, a description most certainly tells you something.
Squishes said:
I accept his dictum that certainty is unwarranted everywhere and unnecessary for anything of importance.
On what grounds do you accept this?
Squishes said:
As far as arguments for God's existence go, I never claimed to be certain in an epistemological sense that all the arguments fail. I just think they do, and I have no reason to think otherwise.
Of course not. Restating the statement according to Squishism, "I just 'brain-fizz' they do, and I have not the kind of 'brain-fizzing' to 'brain-fizz' otherwise. But here's a good reason: The Squishian worldview is absurd and irrational, self-contradictory, incoherent and does not align with human existence and experience, whereas the Biblical worldview is singularly sound, rational, self-consistent, coherent and comports in every way with human existence and experience, to the exclusion of all other god-conceptions.
Induction vs. Inductive Practices
Squishes said:
I mentioned this a little before. Hilston wants to know why I trust inductive practices. Here is a short, concise, and hopefully clear exposition:
I am made to do so. … whatever universe I'm in has given me a brain to deal with the environment in a certain way.
These are words that might very well haunt Squishes in eternity, should he continue to rebel against his knowledge of God. Man is made in God's image, which is to say, Squishes was made to trust inductive practices because logic reflects the mind of God, and God intended for man to feel after Him. Heretofore, Squishes has chosen to push away the innate, immediate and obvious knowledge that he is made in God's image, preferring to attribute his existence, self-awareness and logical processes not to God's special creative work, but to brain-fizzing as the result of godless evolutionary mechanisms.
Squishes said:
Creatures that made predictions and drew correct inferences were favored over others. Many recurring inductive practices were internalized, and even toddlers can recognize when causal relations have gone awry (further discussion of this point upon request).
Squishes presents his defense of his use of inductive practices, to convince us by an appeal to utility (inductive practices work). That is to say, he assumes the future will continue to be like the past. He says that he learns about the world by studying it, not mucking about with sentences. But Squishes hasn't seen the future, therefore, he must depend on something for which he has no legitimate claim: the truth of the uniformity of nature.
Furthermore, induction goes beyond chair-sitting and causality. It is present in every aspect of our daily lives, in our very thinking, when we read sentences, when we balance our checkbooks (even unsuccessfully). Relegating induction to a mere linguistic convention (that only describes brain-fizzing) is contrary to our behavior and experience, in which we regard induction and other immaterial, abstract entities as absolute, universal and invariant laws. The pragmatism Squishes' proffers as a rational explanation is an effort eliminate the necessary precondition for the very notion of rationality. In other words, Squishes cannot justify the very tools he uses to advance his pragmatism.
Squishes said:
There is no solution to the logical problem of induction.
There certainly is, and that is precisely and exclusively the existence and attributes of God.
Squishes said:
But the behavioral problem has been solved. We believe it because we are forced to. We are forced to because it is genetically imparted. It is genetically imparted because it aided in survival.
Yet, those whom Squishes might call "brain-damaged," or "genetically abnormal," whose behavior and perceptions are different from the majority, might have a different belief about the world and induction. My genetically imparted color-blindness makes my visual perceptions different from the majority. But perhaps my perception is actually more accurate than the majority. Who's to say? Who is the arbiter in the dispute? And on what grounds is the majority declared correct? Squishes has no grounds on which to assert the correctness of his view over that of the other. Appeals to statistics, resulting "harm" (arbitrarily defined), etc., cannot be justified in a godless universe.
Squishes said:
That's it. This is why I am a skeptic, and will continue to be an agnostic for the foreseeable future. What you take to be worldview shattering is what I accept and make due with.
It is indeed worldview-shattering, but Squishes' doesn't need to see it for it to be nonetheless true.
Squishes said:
However, Hilston seems to think that invoking God can solve this problem {of induction}:
"Without God's existence, nothing would be intelligible. … In the absence of the God of the Bible (an irrational proposition), there can be no logic, no mathematics, no intelligibility in human experience, let alone the very existence of universals and particulars in any imagined universe (to say nothing of the existence of "imagination"). … Again, picking up patterns in the world and forming beliefs accordingly is unwarranted and arbitrary in a God-less universe. … In a God-less universe, there is nothing wrong with seeking pain and displeasure, holding obviously wrong beliefs, and recklessly forming beliefs. … The grounds on which to say God's mind exclusively accounts for all of reality is rational and defensible. Apart from the existence and attributes of God, there are no rational grounds upon which to even discuss "mind-dependent constructions". … And apart from the existence of God, there can be no grounding or justification. In fact, the anti-theist must actually highjack the tools of the Biblical worldview in order to mount their attack against it. " ...
Etc.
I am not convinced.
Quite irrelevant. What Squishes is really saying is "My brain can't fizz that way." But he's wrong. To Squishes, the laws of logic are but a human construct, and they are not really laws (despite the fact that we all act as if they are). If everything is just matter in motion, which is the necessary implication of Squishism, and the "laws of logic" are merely brain states, then they can't be universal (despite the fact that we act as if they are), because what happens in one man's brain does not legislate over what is in another man's brain, nor does it necessarily correspond with what happens in the brain of another. If the laws of logic are merely human constructs or conventions, then what justifies the assumption that a "logical practice" that is demonstrated in one area of human experience be taken as true in other similar areas not yet experienced? On what grounds does someone posit "If A is B, and B is C, then A is C"? On what rational basis does one proceed through life on the assumption that such a transitive description should be taken as true in general? If the laws of logic are merely sociological constructs, then anyone can arbitrarily stipulate their own laws by claiming contradictions are factual truths, that question-begging is legitimate argumentation, that it's OK to be irrational, etc. But no one, including Squishes, comes to a debate or reads a debate expecting the participants to behave that way. Nor is it expected that they should first sit down and agree upon logical constructs. When Squishes and I raised the issue of induction or mentioned tautologies, we did not have to define these terms. When we step up to debate, it is already assumed (despite Squishes' assertions) that the laws of logic exist, are universal, invariant and necessary for discursive thought and rational discourse. But in spite of these tacit assumptions, evidenced by our behavior in this very discourse, Squishes wants to relegate "logic" to synaptic signalling in our encephalic glands, regardless of the fact that we do not share the same brain.
If Squishes were to recognize that human rationality can only be accounted for if reality comprises immaterial, abstract, universal, invariant entities such as laws and concepts and minds, he would see that God alone, the God of the bible, is the necessary precondition for the intelligibility of human experience. But as a materialist, Squishes will not allow, and works very hard to deny, any such thing as an immaterial, abstract entity. The Squishian Stubbed Toe Criterion conveniently eliminates any consideration of nonphysical entities. Why? Because Squishianism and all its proponents recognize that allowing abstract entities to gain a foothold is to open the Pandora's Box of God's necessary existence, and hence their accountability to Him.
Consider the following analogy:
A young man who was out hunting fell over a precipice into the valley of the blind. There was no escape. The blind men did not understand him when he spoke of seeing the sun and the colors of the rainbow, but a fine young lady did understand him when he spoke the language of love. The father of the girl would not consent to the marriage of his daughter to a lunatic who spoke so often of things that did not exist. But the great psychologists of the blind men's university offered to cure him of his lunacy by sewing up his eyelids. Then, they assured him, he would be normal like "everybody" else. But the simple seer went on protesting that he did see the sun. ~ "Why I Believe in God," Cornelius Van Til
Squishes wants us to be "normal," like him. But he cannot justify his "normal," nor can he account for the tools by which he seeks to advance his theory.
Squishes' Questions
Squishes said:
In a telling paragraph, Hilston just asserts the connection between the standards of rationality and God's existence:
"The tools we use to make proofs, namely, our systems of logic, language and mathematics, reflect God's nature and character. His existence and attributes exclusively account for and justify our use of these tools and our reliance upon them in our everyday experience."
To this I press the Cartesian worry even further. Let's suppose we even know what it means to "reflect God's nature and character." Let's suppose that my earlier worry about the incoherence of the falsity of the rules of logic and the conceivability of God's non-existence. I'll ask a simple question:
Why does God get out of the epistemological problem?
As the Ultimate Knower, God has exhaustive knowledge and experience. God can truly say, "All men are mortal." This is why the existence of God is the only solution to the problem of induction.
Squishes said:
How does God know he isn't a brain in a vat? How does God know he is in the real world and not in an illusion? How is God able to ground knowledge and give an account of induction? When God created the universe and set it's laws, how can he be sure they won't change?
The same logic applies. Squishes' questions cannot apply to the Biblical God, Who is ultimate and transcendent, not subject to any authority, law or concept. It is not possible that God is merely a brain in a vat, or that His experience in the universe is merely an illusion, or that He cannot ground knowledge nor give an account of induction, or that He is uncertain about the permanence of His own laws, because such a "god" could not account for reality and rationality as we know it. God Himself, His existence and attributes, is the pre-condition for knowledge and rationality. It is not possible for the Biblical God not to exist, and it is not possible that the sort of god you describe could exist.
Squishes said:
Further, even if I grant that a God must exist to account for all these related phenomena, there is a long jump to explicit Christian belief.
Not at all, if by "Christian belief" you intend "Biblical belief." The fact is, the Biblical description of God is the only one that is self-consistent, self-attesting, non-contradictory and accounts for all the aforementioned phenomena.
Hilston said:
I believe in the inerrancy and authority of the Bible for two reasons: (1) Because I was compelled to believe it by the witness of the Holy Spirit that resides in me and every believer;
Squishes said:
How are you sure that was the Holy Spirit? That doesn't sound very reliable.
Why is this relevant? The Bible says that His Spirit bears witness to the spirit of the regenerated individual that he is a child of God, that the claims and historicity of the Scripture are true. However, the Bible also says that all men, even the unregenerate, are without a reasoned defense, without excuse, and know that God exists and that they are accountable to Him.
Hilston said:
and (2) because given the existence of God, it is expected (predictable) that God would not only testify to His own existence within man and via His creation,
Squishes said:
There is no clear connection between the God of logic and this social God.
That's like saying there is no clear connection between one's logical faculties and one's interpersonal ones. It doesn't make any sense. God is the Logos, the source of logic, and He is a trinity, a divine society within Himself, unified in thought, purpose and action.
Squishes said:
Why would you expect God to testify to His existence? Isn't it logically possible that God would create the world and not interact with it? Perhaps God does not care if anyone believes He exists.
Not possible, given the way He designed us as creative, social and seeking people, created in His own image.
Hilston said:
but also that He would provide explicit, eyewitness testimony and documented guidance in understanding His will and purposes for mankind.
Squishes said:
That does not follow at all.
It does absolutely. God is a lawful God. Nature follows laws, our mental processes are subject to laws. But these alone are not sufficient to give us guidance to live in a manner that is most pleasing to God and most beneficial to us. Thus it was necessary to provide special revelation from God to man, hence the documented word of God.
Materialists, behaviorists, pragmatists, deflationists, atomists, physicalists, structuralists and naturalists have at least one thing in common: they deny the existence of abstract, invariant, immaterial entities, such as laws of logic and thought, concepts and the mind. Human perceptions of freedom, responsibility, creativity, and morality are merely illusions, according to the aforementioned "-ists," the results of biochemistry in the brain and the products of our conditioned physiology.
What must be exposed concerning this view is the moral component, the true impetus behind it. Reducing humanity to sheer behavior conveniently eliminates moral accountability. If we are little more than bags of molecules bumping into one another, then there is no need to account for anything we do; there is no right or wrong, logic or illogic, no truth or goodness or beauty. As Squishes has elsewhere said, "… beliefs are things that happen to us, not something we pick out like the day's outfit."
It is in this way that Squishes and others like him speciously seek to absolve themselves of what they already know deep down: That God is indeed watching them, that He exists and will hold them accountable for what they say and do. To be certain, they will disclaim any such motive (as if there were any such thing as "motive") and claim some imagined neutrality in their consideration of God's existence and arguments thereto. But this is a smokescreen, albeit a self-delusional one. For the Bible says that all men know that God exists, and that they are accountable to Him. They suppress, hold down and push away this truth in their rebellion, all the while pretending to others and to themselves that they are making honest and neutral inquiry into the "possibility" of God's existence, which is an irrational enterprise at best.
Thank you again for this dialogue. I'm enjoying it very much.
Hilston